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DANIEL EPPS

& GANESH SITARAMAN

How to Save the Supreme Court
abstract. The consequences of Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court conﬁrmation are

seismic. Justice Kavanaugh, replacing Justice Anthony Kennedy, completes a new conservative majority and represents a stunning Republican victory after decades of increasingly partisan battles
over control of the Court. The result is a Supreme Court whose Justices are likely to vote along
party lines more consistently than ever before in American history. That development gravely
threatens the Court’s legitimacy. If in the future roughly half of Americans lack conﬁdence in the
Supreme Court’s ability to render impartial justice, the Court’s power to settle important questions
of law will be in serious jeopardy. Moreover, many Democrats are already calling for changes like
court-packing to prevent the new conservative majority from blocking progressive reforms. Even
if justiﬁed, such moves could provoke further escalation that would leave the Court’s image and
the rule of law badly damaged.
The coming crisis can be stopped. But saving the Court’s legitimacy as an institution above
politics will require a radical rethinking of how the Court has operated for more than two centuries. In this Feature, we outline a new framework for Supreme Court reform. Speciﬁcally, we argue
for reforms that are plausibly constitutional (and thus implementable by statute) and that are capable of creating a stable equilibrium even if initially implemented using “hardball” tactics. Under
this framework, we evaluate existing proposals and offer two of our own: the Supreme Court Lottery and the Balanced Bench. Whether policymakers adopt these precise proposals or not, our
framework can guide their much-needed search for reform. We can save what is good about the
Court—but only if we are willing to transform the Court.
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introduction
Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s conﬁrmation to replace Justice Anthony Kennedy
on the Supreme Court was a seismic event for constitutional law and for the
American political system. The new conservative majority that Justice Kavanaugh completes represented a stunning victory for the Republican Party after
decades of effort by the conservative legal movement—and, by the same token,
a signiﬁcant defeat for Democrats and the American left. But although Republicans look like the short-term winners, the ultimate loser here isn’t just their
Democratic opponents. It’s the Supreme Court itself—and, eventually, the
American people as a whole.
Recent events have already taken a toll on perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy. Justice Kavanaugh’s 50-48 conﬁrmation vote was one of the closest in
American history. 1 The vote came after a process that deeply divided the country,
when Republicans stuck with their nominee after serious accusations of sexual
misconduct—and even after Justice Kavanaugh gave testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee that many viewed as “nakedly partisan.” 2 President Trump’s
ﬁrst nominee, Justice Neil Gorsuch, joined the Court only after unprecedented
tactics by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell to stonewall President
Obama’s nominee, Judge Merrick Garland, and leave the seat open. But these
debacles were only the latest in an increasingly politicized ﬁght over Justices. The
predictable result is a Supreme Court whose Justices—on both sides—are more
likely to vote along party lines than ever before in American history. Soon, Lee
Epstein and Eric Posner warn, “it will become impossible to regard the [C]ourt
as anything but a partisan institution.” 3

1.

One senator abstained, for a ﬁnal vote of 50-48-1. Chris Keller, Senate Vote on Kavanaugh Was
Historically Close, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018, 5:35 PM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la
-pol-scotus-conﬁrmation-votes-over-the-years-20181005-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc
/EB85-Q4JE]. The closest margin in history was 24-23, in the 1881 conﬁrmation of Justice
Matthews, under a cloud of suspected nepotism. See Sheldon Gilbert, A Look at the Closest
Court Conﬁrmation Ever, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Oct. 6, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/a-look-at-the-closest-court-conﬁrmation-ever [https://perma.cc/LT64
-Z75L].

2.

Zack Beauchamp, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis Is Here, VOX (Oct. 6, 2018, 4:02
PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/6/17915854/brett-kavanaugh
-senate-conﬁrmed-supreme-court-legitimacy [https://perma.cc/3LNL-YZV7].
Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, Opinion, If the Supreme Court Is Nakedly Political, Can It Be Just?,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/supreme-court
-nominee-trump.html [https://perma.cc/L497-C3VE].

3.
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That development presents a grave threat to the Court’s legitimacy—that is,
the degree to which it is perceived as legitimate by the American people. 4 If
Americans lose their faith in the Supreme Court’s ability to render impartial justice, the Court might lose its power to resolve important questions in ways that
all Americans can live with. Raising the stakes even higher, many Democrats are
already calling for reprisals like court-packing, 5 which, even if justiﬁed, could
provoke further escalation that would tarnish the Court’s image and damage the
rule of law.
Can this coming crisis be stopped? Or, more starkly: can the Supreme Court
be saved? We think so. But preserving the Court’s legitimacy as an institution
above politics will require a complete rethinking of how the Court works and
how the Justices are chosen. To save what is good about the Court, we must
reject and rethink much of how the Court has operated for more than two centuries.
And the Court is, we think, worth saving. American democracy could likely
still function if the Supreme Court had too little capital to stand up to the political branches. But there are good reasons to want to have an institution like the
Court that can check the political process and hold us to our deepest commitments. More importantly, in the United States, public conﬁdence in the Supreme
Court is impossible to disentangle from public conﬁdence in the very idea of law
itself, as an enterprise separate from politics. And a democracy that loses its conﬁdence in law may not long survive.

4.

5.

The term “legitimacy,” when applied to the Supreme Court, can have several meanings. Richard Fallon has distinguished between “sociological, moral, and legal concepts of legitimacy.”
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 21 (2018). Our focus
here is squarely on questions of sociological legitimacy, which as deﬁned by Fallon “involves
prevailing public attitudes toward governments, institutions, or decisions. It depends on what
factually is the case about how people think or respond—not on what their thinking ought to
be.” Id. Yet questions of sociological legitimacy may have important implications for other
forms of legal legitimacy. For a fascinating argument about the tension between different
kinds of legitimacy, see Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 2240, 2245 (2019) (reviewing FALLON, supra, and arguing that “in politically charged
moments, the Justices may feel pressure to sacriﬁce the legal legitimacy of their judicial decisions in order to preserve the sociological legitimacy of the Court as a whole”).
See, e.g., Aaron Blake, Pack the Supreme Court? Why We May Be Getting Closer, WASH.
POST (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/09/pack-supreme
-court-why-we-may-be-getting-closer [https://perma.cc/2MS9-JPY4]; Michael Klarman,
Why Democrats Should Pack the Supreme Court, TAKE CARE BLOG (Oct. 15, 2018), https://
takecareblog.com/blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc
/62LV-PBNH]; Ian Samuel, Kavanaugh Will Be on the US Supreme Court for Life. Here’s How
We Fight Back, GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2018, 4:00 PM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2018/oct/09/kavanaugh-us-supreme-court-ﬁght-back-court-packing
[https://perma.cc/5ZUG-LZE8].
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In this Feature, we offer a framework for thinking about saving the Supreme
Court. We explain how only Supreme Court reforms—and only the right kinds
of reform—can preserve the Court’s role as a neutral arbiter of important questions of law. We begin in Part I by discussing why the Court’s legitimacy faces
signiﬁcant peril in the near term. Several factors—such as increased polarization
in society, the development of polarized schools of legal interpretation aligned
with political affiliations, and greater interest-group attention to the Supreme
Court nomination process—have conspired to create a system in which the Court
has become a political football, and in which each nominee can be expected to
predictably vote along ideological lines that track partisan affiliation. Justice
Kennedy—even though he was mostly a reliable conservative—may well be the
last Justice to vote against his partisan affiliation in some of the highest-proﬁle
cases. With his replacement, the notion of the Court as an institution above the
political fray might soon vanish.
Next, in Part II, we consider what kinds of reforms would best protect the
Court’s perceived role as a legitimate, nonpartisan arbiter of important legal
questions. Any solution must have at least three components. First, it must be
constitutionally plausible, even if not bulletproof. Second, it must be capable of
implementation via statute, given the near impossibility of a constitutional
amendment in an age of severe polarization. Finally, even though overwhelming
bipartisan support might not be possible at the time of reform, the proposal
needs to be stable going forward. That is, it has to be something that both sides
might be able to live with in the long term, leading to a fair equilibrium. Unfortunately, some of the most prominent reform proposals do not satisfy these criteria; and in some cases, they would make the Court’s politicization even worse.
Most importantly, in Part III, we offer two reforms of our own. We call these
the Supreme Court Lottery and the Balanced Bench. We offer these alternative
approaches because policymakers might have different views about their viability, if and when Congress takes up Supreme Court reform. For each, we discuss
the plan and its beneﬁts and then assess its constitutionality. We think either
would be an excellent framework for reform. Though neither would perfectly
solve all the problems we identify with the Supreme Court, both would be a
marked improvement over the status quo.
Whether policymakers adopt these precise proposals or not, it is imperative
that they search for reforms along these lines. Doing nothing means that the
Court’s legitimacy will continue to suffer in the eyes of the public. The Court
risks being gravely damaged by clashes between the conservative majority and
progressive politicians, if and when Democrats regain power in the political
branches. But nakedly political reforms like court-packing—even if a justiﬁed
response to Republican escalation—may not lead to a stable equilibrium and
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could end up damaging the rule of law. The best way to save the Court is to
transform the Court.
i. the looming threat
As many observers have noted, the Supreme Court is facing an unprecedented legitimacy crisis in the wake of Justice Kennedy’s retirement and Justice
Kavanaugh’s conﬁrmation. 6 Commentators identify several serious dangers facing the Court going forward. First is the seemingly undeniable fact that the
Court will be more polarized along party lines than at any point in recent history.
As Epstein and Posner explain, Justice Kennedy was the last Supreme Court appointee to vote “with any regularity” against the ideology of the President who
named him to the Court. 7 Every subsequent appointee has hewn more closely to
party ideology; and Justice Kennedy’s replacement, Justice Kavanaugh, is by all
accounts a reliable conservative who is unlikely to break this new trend. 8 Thus,
“[f]or the ﬁrst time in living memory, the [C]ourt will be seen by the public as
a party-dominated institution, one whose votes on controversial issues are essentially determined by the party affiliation of recent presidents.” 9
Indeed, even when Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt proposed his
famous court-packing plan in the 1930s, his antagonists on the Supreme Court
were not all of the opposing party. One of the “four horsemen,” Justice James
McReynolds, had been appointed by Democratic President Woodrow Wilson. 10
Another, Justice Pierce Butler, was also a Democrat (although one appointed by
Republican President Warren G. Harding). 11 Moreover, four of the ﬁve Justices
who ultimately “broke the logjam” in favor of President Roosevelt’s policies were
Republicans. 12

6.

See Beauchamp, supra note 2.

7.

Epstein & Posner, supra note 3.
Id.

8.
9.
10.

Id.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 214 (1993).

11.

See David R. Stras, Pierce Butler: A Supreme Technician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 695, 712 (2009)
(explaining how President Harding chose Justice Butler because political expediency counseled in favor of choosing a Catholic Democrat). Interestingly, Justice Butler’s selection was
motivated partly by concerns about public legitimacy. See HENRY L. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS AND SENATORS 149 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that Chief Justice Taft “persuaded the president that the Court had become ‘too Republican’ in the public eye and that, consequently,
the new appointee ought to be a congenial Democrat”).
12. Richard Primus, The Republic in Long-Term Perspective, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 10 (2018).
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Similar observations could be made about other points of particular controversy in the Court’s history. Brown v. Board of Education 13 ignited a political ﬁrestorm. Southern politicians engaged in a campaign of “massive resistance” to the
Court’s efforts to force desegregation. 14 Yet as controversial as Brown and subsequent desegregation decisions were, it was hard to paint the conﬂict as primarily a partisan clash between Democrats and Republicans. Brown was written by
Chief Justice Warren, a Republican appointee, and was joined unanimously by
the eight Democratic-appointed Justices. Meanwhile, most of the Southern opposition was led by conservative Democratic politicians.
So too with other conﬂicts. Roe v. Wade 15 generated a signiﬁcant backlash
among conservatives; but the decision was written by a Republican-appointed
Justice and joined by four more. A Democratic-appointed Justice was one of the
two dissenters. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 16 is perhaps the
most politically controversial decision of the last decade; but both the majority
and the lead dissent were written by Republican-appointed Justices.
Perhaps the greatest threat to the Court’s legitimacy in recent years was Bush
v. Gore, 17 which involved ﬁve Republican-appointed Justices effectively delivering a contested presidential election to the Republican candidate. In the short
term, the decision generated sharply polarized responses from the American
people. 18 Yet “the initial polarization toward the Court evaporated within a year
of the decision.” 19 Within less than a decade, the Court was more popular among
Democrats than Republicans in opinion polls. 20 Social scientists have explained
the public’s quick acceptance of Bush v. Gore by suggesting that “because the
Court enjoyed such a deep reservoir of good will, most Americans were predisposed to view the Court’s involvement as appropriate.” 21 Other factors likely
played a role as well. Vice President Al Gore accepted the Court’s decision as
13.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. See Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM.
HIST. 81, 82 (1994).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16.
17.

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
531 U.S. 98 (2000).

18.

See Jeffrey L. Yates & Andrew B. Whitford, The Presidency and the Supreme Court After Bush v.
Gore: Implications for Institutional Legitimacy and Effectiveness, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 112
(2002).
19. Nathaniel Persily, Foreword: The Legacy of Bush v. Gore in Public Opinion and American Law,
23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 325, 325 (2011).
20. See id.
21.
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ﬁnal; 22 and in the years after the decision, the Court—due to “swing” votes by
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy—offered up a number of high-proﬁle decisions
amenable to Democrats and progressives. 23 Today, by contrast, the Republicanappointed majority appears more reliably conservative, and Democratic politicians seem much more willing to challenge the Court as partisan.
Thus, while the Court has come under political assault at this and other
points in history, we think the rise of a Court polarized on party lines makes the
present moment particularly dangerous. There is uncertainty as to what exactly
the rise of a partisan Court portends, but it is hard to imagine that the Court will
continue to enjoy public conﬁdence if half the country sees the majority of Justices as political agents working for the other team.
It might not be an overstatement to say that Dred Scott v. Sandford 24 and its
surrounding politics presents the most useful analogue to the present period.
While we do not contend that the country is headed for civil war, Dred Scott provides lessons about what can happen when the country sees the Supreme Court
as beholden to one side in a contentious public debate. In the run-up to the Civil
War, the country was bitterly divided over the issue of slavery along regional
lines. In Dred Scott, Americans perceived the Court as handing one side total victory in that highly divisive conﬂict. Political rhetoric around the decision was
ﬁery; Abraham Lincoln famously charged that the decision was the result of “a
conspiracy to make slavery national.” 25
The national rift that Dred Scott widened was the regional conﬂict between
the free North and slaveholding South. Today, by contrast, our political system
is increasingly divided on party lines. 26 And now, the Supreme Court is perfectly

22.

See Text of Gore’s Concession Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2000), https://
www.nytimes.com/2000/12/13/politics/text-of-goreacutes-concession-speech.html
[https://perma.cc/UEW5-3VJG] (“[W]hile I strongly disagree with the [C]ourt’s decision, I
accept it. I accept the ﬁnality of this outcome . . . .”).

23.

Examples include Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003); and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).

24.

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
25. Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1858),
in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245, 282 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
26. Social-science research has demonstrated how, over recent decades, Americans who identify
with the two major political parties have become much more polarized in their views. Some
of the more recent studies of this shift include MARC J. HETHERINGTON & THOMAS J. RANDOLPH, WHY WASHINGTON WON’T WORK 15-21 (2015); LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY 3-4 (2018); and NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T.
POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL
RICHES 12-13 (2d ed. 2016).
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polarized on party lines as well—for the ﬁrst time, all Democrat-appointed Justices are reliably liberal and all Republican-appointed Justices are reliably conservative. 27 The reasons why this is happening now are complex, but a signiﬁcant part of the story, as Neal Devins and Lawrence Baum argue, is the rise of
distinct and polarized groups of legal elites with different approaches to legal
interpretation. 28
The Court today raises other legitimacy concerns beyond party domination.
One distinct problem is the Supreme Court’s lack of democratic pedigree. Of
course, the “countermajoritarian difficulty” posed by the Court has been the subject of decades of debate among constitutional theorists. 29 Today, though, the
Court has become particularly countermajoritarian. The problem is not just that
the Justices themselves are insulated from politics through life tenure; it is also
that the political actors selecting them suffer from serious democratic deﬁcits. As
Michael Tomasky notes, the two most recent additions to the Court were selected
“by a president and a Senate who represent the will of a minority of the American
people.” 30 In fact, only three of the current Justices (Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, and Kagan) were nominated by a President who entered office after
winning the majority of the national popular vote. 31
These more general concerns are exacerbated by the circumstances of how
the two newest Justices joined the Court. As noted, Justice Gorsuch only was
able to become a Justice after Senate Republicans’ unprecedented blockade of
President Obama’s nominee, Judge Garland. The Court was left with eight Justices for more than a year after Justice Scalia’s death; and Senate Republicans
refused to even hold a hearing for Judge Garland, despite his incontrovertible

27.

See NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS
CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 5 (2019) (noting that “never before [in the Court’s history]
were there competing ideological blocs that coincided with party lines”).
28. See generally id.
29.

See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPIN-

ION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION

(2009).

30.

Michael Tomasky, Opinion, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/supreme-courts-legitimacy-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/P4RY-8RL4] (noting that President Trump lost the popular vote and that
the ﬁfty Senators who conﬁrmed Justice Kavanaugh “collectively won fewer votes in their last
election” than the Senators who opposed him).
31. Id.
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qualiﬁcations, relative centrism, and majority support among the American people. 32
Then, after Donald Trump assumed office and the Presidency passed into
Republican control, the Senate moved swiftly to consider and conﬁrm Justice
Gorsuch. After Senate Democrats ﬁlibustered the nomination, Senate Republicans invoked the so-called “nuclear option,” changing longstanding rules to
lower the voting threshold for cloture on Supreme Court nominees from sixty
votes to a simple majority 33 (which Senate Democrats had themselves exercised
when they were in power four years earlier, for nominees to the lower courts and
executive offices). 34 The Senate’s handling of the vacancy generated signiﬁcant
outrage on the left, with some going so far as to argue that Justice Gorsuch
should be considered illegitimate. 35
The inescapable conclusion from these events is that the party affiliation of
Supreme Court Justices matters—and that politicians will go to great lengths to
control the Court. Indeed, politicians today openly admit that raw power is the
name of the game when it comes to Supreme Court nominations. Recently, Senator McConnell made clear that if another Supreme Court vacancy occurred in

32.

See Supreme Court, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx
[https://perma.cc/UE2T-R6BB] (noting results of a March 2016 survey showing 52% support for Garland’s conﬁrmation, with 29% opposed and 19% having no opinion).

33.

See Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for Gorsuch,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch
-supreme-court-senate.html [https://perma.cc/267Z9MA2].
34. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on Nominees,
WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to
-limit-ﬁlibusters-in-party-line -vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent /2013/11/21
/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html [https://perma.cc/HK97-T98L].
35. See, e.g., David Faris, How Democrats Can Make Republicans Pay for Justice Gorsuch, THE WEEK
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://theweek.com/articles/681352/how-democrats-make-republicans
-pay-justice-gorsuch [https://perma.cc/R7V3-J9SU] (“Gorsuch’s seat was stolen by a craven
act of democratic sabotage, and he will always be sitting in a chair reserved for the nominee
of a Democratic president. He is illegitimate today, and he will be illegitimate 20 years from
now.”); Lawrence Weschler, How the US Supreme Court Lost Its Legitimacy, NATION (Sept. 17,
2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-us-supreme-court-lost-its-legitimacy
[https://perma.cc/TQ9F-BGYF] (“Between the kabuki theater of Gorsuch’s conﬁrmation
hearing and the circumstances that allowed for his nomination in the ﬁrst place, his tenure on
the Court will always have an asterisk next to it. For as long as he presides, Gorsuch’s will
need to be considered a ‘bastard’ vote in all future 5-4 decisions.”).
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2020, he would allow President Trump to ﬁll the seat—thus shredding any conceivably neutral justiﬁcation for refusing to permit President Obama to appoint
a Justice in an election year. 36
One might have hoped that Justice Kavanaugh’s conﬁrmation process would
be less damaging to perceptions of judicial legitimacy than the Garland/Gorsuch
debacle had been. To be sure, the nomination was high-stakes; Justice Kennedy
had been the “swing” Justice for many years, and the chance to replace him with
a more reliable conservative gave Republicans a chance to reshape the law. Yet
Justice Kennedy’s seat couldn’t be considered “stolen.” Under pre-Garland
norms, the vacancy was President Trump’s to ﬁll by right, given that it became
open during his presidency. Many expected a swift, relatively uneventful conﬁrmation process. 37
That was not to be. Days before the Senate Judiciary Committee was to vote
on the nomination, Dr. Christine Blasey Ford came forward to allege a sexual
assault by Justice Kavanaugh during high school. 38 More allegations emerged,
capturing public attention and forcing the Judiciary Committee to delay its vote
until both Dr. Ford and Justice Kavanaugh could testify. At that hearing, Justice
Kavanaugh offered testimony that shocked many. 39 He lambasted the “two-

36.

See Ted Barrett, In Reversal From 2016, McConnell Says He Would Fill a Potential Supreme Court
Vacancy in 2020, CNN (May 29, 2019, 7:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/28
/politics/mitch-mcconnell-supreme-court-2020 [https://perma.cc/T8Q J-KZ3N].

37.

Bret Stephens, Opinion, Just Conﬁrm Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/opinion/kavanaugh-supreme-court-conﬁrm.html
[https://perma.cc/397T-ZZA4] (“Kavanaugh will almost certainly be conﬁrmed. . . . Republican
moderates . . . spoke[] approvingly of his nomination.”).

38.

See Emma Brown, California Professor, Writer of Conﬁdential Brett Kavanaugh Letter, Speaks Out
About Her Allegation of Sexual Assault, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com /investigations /california-professor-writer-of-conﬁdential-brett
-kavanaugh-letter-speaks-out-about-her-allegation-of-sexual-assault/2018/09/16/46982194
-b846-11e8-94eb-3bd52dfe917b_story.html [https://perma.cc/K3EZ-ZLBU].
39. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, I Know Brett Kavanaugh, but I Wouldn’t Conﬁrm Him, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/why-i-wouldnt-conﬁrm
-brett-kavanaugh/571936 [https://perma.cc/452A-BZFT] (“The allegations against [Kavanaugh] shocked me very deeply, but not quite so deeply as did his presentation.”); Richard
Wolffe, Brett Kavanaugh’s Credibility Has Not Survived This Devastating Hearing, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/27/brett-kavanaugh-credibility-devastating-hearing [https://perma.cc/68Z7-GUS3] (“As a federal appeals court judge, Kavanaugh’s performance was jarringly unbalanced and at times
unhinged.”).
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week effort” surrounding the allegations as “a calculated and orchestrated political hit,” a form of “[r]evenge on behalf of the Clintons.” 40 He went on to address Democratic committee members with contempt and disrespect. 41 Observers condemned his performance as highly improper for a judge, with many
saying that his testimony disqualiﬁed him for the Supreme Court regardless of
the truth of the underlying allegations. 42 Some even alleged that he lied under
oath. 43 As a result, it will be hard for many Americans to see Justice Kavanaugh
as fair and impartial.
Given this course of events, many believe the Court’s legitimacy now faces a
daunting challenge. 44 These concerns are by no means limited to the liberal commentariat, but have been voiced by mainstream political ﬁgures. Former Attorney General Eric Holder, for example, suggested that “[w]ith the conﬁrmation
of Kavanaugh and the process which led to it, (and the treatment of Garland),
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court can justiﬁably be questioned.” 45 Even a sitting member of the Supreme Court, Justice Elena Kagan, recently warned that it
was “a dangerous time for the Court” because “people increasingly look at us

40.

Kavanaugh Hearing: Transcript, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), https://
www. washingtonpost.com /news /national /wp /2018 /09/27/kavanaugh-hearing-transcript
[https://perma.cc/F9X5-R2F7].
41. See, e.g., id. (“[D]o you like beer, Senator, or not?”).
42.

See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Opinion, All the Ways a Justice Kavanaugh Would Have to Recuse
Himself, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/opinion/justice
-kavanaugh-recuse-himself.html [https://perma.cc/NV98-6JJY] (describing Justice Kavanaugh’s “intemperate personal attacks” and “his partisan tirades” as “display[ing] a strikingly injudicious temperament”); Wittes, supra note 39.
43. See, e.g., James Roche, I Was Brett Kavanaugh’s College Roommate, SLATE (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/brett-kavanaugh-college-roommate-jamie
-roche.html [https://perma.cc/76TW-2B43] (“Brett Kavanaugh stood up under oath and lied
about his drinking . . . .”).
44. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Opinion, Trust in the Justices of the Supreme Court Is Waning. Here
Are Three Ways to Fortify the Court, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018, 3:15 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-ackerman-supreme-court-reconstruction
-20181220-story.html [https://perma.cc/8Y4W-TXQQ]; Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion,
Court’s Legitimacy Is in Question, HERALD & REV. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://herald-review.com/opinion/columnists/erwin-chemerinsky-court-s-legitimacy-is-in-question/article
_d90aec75-ffe0-51c7-8cc0-3d9f5c19982b.html [https://perma.cc/YX9X-LXN7]; see also
Grove, supra note 4, at 2240 (noting that “it is striking how many commentators . . . have
recently questioned the legitimacy of the United States Supreme Court”).
45.

Eric Holder (@EricHolder), TWITTER (Oct. 6, 2018, 1:10 PM), https://twitter.com
/EricHolder/status/1048666766677876738 [https://perma.cc/2ZGR-QRHC].
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and say ‘this is just an extension of the political process.’” 46 Indeed, polling data
provides some evidence that much of the public sees the Justices as political actors—and also that this perception worsened in the wake of the Kavanaugh conﬁrmation. 47 A recent analysis of perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy concluded
that the Court as of late 2018 was in “a weaker position now than at nearly any
point in modern history.” 48
And of course, we haven’t even discussed the legitimacy concerns that will
be raised by the actual decisions the Supreme Court will render in the coming
years. There is good reason to expect the new conservative majority to assert its
power in high-proﬁle, controversial cases. Most obvious is the possibility—
though not the certainty—that the Court will overturn Roe v. Wade 49 and thereby
permit state legislatures to criminalize abortion (a possibility that a number of
state legislatures seem to be eagerly anticipating). 50 Many people throughout
46.

Ian Millhiser, Kagan Warns That the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Is in Danger, THINKPROGRESS
(Sept. 17, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://thinkprogress.org/justice-kagan-warns-that-the-supreme
-courts-legitimacy-is-in-danger-2de1192d5636 [https://perma.cc/9XNA-72UT].

47.

One national poll asked Americans: “In general, do you think that the Supreme Court is
mainly motivated by politics or mainly motivated by the law?” In July 2018, 50% of respondents answered “mainly politics.” Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ. Poll, U.S. Voter Support for
Abortion Is High, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; 94 Percent Back Universal Gun
Background Checks 3 (May 22, 2019), https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/us/us05222019
_usch361.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFS9-E9U2]. By May 2019, after the Kavanaugh conﬁrmation battle, that number (which already seems quite high) had risen to 55%. See id.
48. Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux & Oliver Roeder, Is The Supreme Court Facing a Legitimacy Crisis?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://ﬁvethirtyeight.com/features/is-the
-supreme-court-facing-a-legitimacy-crisis [https://perma.cc/R6X4-HCTW].
49.
50.
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410 U.S. 113 (1973).
In recent months, a number of states have passed, or considered passing, measures that appear
impossible to reconcile with Roe and its progeny. Most notably, Alabama passed a law banning
abortion entirely, except when necessary to save the mother’s life—making no exceptions for
rape or incest. See Emily Wax-Thibodeaux & Chip Brownlee, Alabama Senate Passes Nation’s
Most Restrictive Abortion Ban, Which Makes No Exceptions for Victims of Rape and Incest, WASH.
POST (May 14, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/alabama-senate-passes
-nations-most-restrictive -abortion-law-which-makes -no-exceptions-for-victims-of-rape
-and-incest/2019/05/14/e3022376-7665-11e9-b3f5-5673edf2d127_story.html
[https://
perma.cc/5VYD-55GZ]. Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio all recently
passed measures banning abortions at a very early point in pregnancy. See Tara Law, Here Are
the Details of the Abortion Legislation in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Elsewhere, TIME (July
2, 2019, 5:21 PM ET), https://time.com/5591166/state-abortion-laws-explained [https://
perma.cc/5K9D-UGE3]. Texas recently considered, though did not pass, a bill that could have
exposed women and doctors involved in abortions to the death penalty. See Julia Jacobs, Failed
Texas Bill Would Have Made Death Penalty Possible in Abortion Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/us/texas-abortion-death-penalty.html
[https://perma.cc/9QKC-FGJA]. These laws’ supporters often explicitly state that the laws’
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American society object to abortion, and commentators across the political spectrum have criticized the Court’s work in Roe on various grounds. 51 Nonetheless,
many Americans have come to take Roe and the right it recognized for granted;
and some two-thirds wish to see it preserved, according to polling. 52 Its explicit
rejection by the Court would be an avulsive change—one that would generate
massive outrage among much of the country (even if it elated others). Such a
development would make the Court even more of a political focal point than it
is now.
Even if the Court declines to revisit Roe, there is little doubt that the Justices
will wade into many other divisive areas over the coming years: the intersection
of gay rights and religious liberty, the rights of corporations, the constitutionality of affirmative-action programs, the scope of presidential power, challenges to
federal legislation under the Commerce Clause, thorny issues of free speech, and
more. There is good reason to expect that, in at least some instances, the Court

purpose is to provoke the Supreme Court into overturning, or at least cutting back, on the Roe
right. See, e.g., Wax-Thibodeaux & Brownlee, supra (“Those who backed the new [Alabama]
law said they don’t expect it to take effect, instead intending its passage to be part of a broader
strategy by antiabortion activists to persuade the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider
[Roe] . . . .”).
51.

See, e.g., Robert M. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM
L. REV. 807, 809 (1973) (“Roe v. Wade is in the worst tradition of a tragic judicial aberration
that periodically wounds American jurisprudence and, in the process, irreparably harms untold numbers of human beings.”); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973) (arguing that Roe was “a very bad decision . . . .
because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be”);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985) (arguing that “Roe ventured too far in the change it ordered”);
Gerald Gunther, Commentary—Some Reﬂections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots, and Prospects, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 817, 819 (“I have not yet found a satisfying rationale to justify
Roe . . . on the basis of modes of constitutional interpretation I consider legitimate.”); John T.
Noonan Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REV. 668, 679 (1984) (arguing
that in Roe and its progeny the Court has failed to “perceive the reality of the extraordinary
beauty of each human being put to death in the name of the abortion liberty and concealed
from legal recognition by a jurisprudence that substitutes a judge’s ﬁat for the truth”).
52. In adhering to the core of Roe’s holding, the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992), stressed that “people have organized intimate relationships and made choices
that deﬁne their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability
of abortion” in light of Roe. Id. at 856. One recent opinion poll found that sixty-seven percent
of Americans said they did not want Roe to be overturned. See Press Release, Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation, Poll: Two-Thirds of Americans Don’t Want the Supreme Court to Overturn Roe v. Wade (June 29, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/press-release/poll
-two-thirds-of-americans-dont-want-the-supreme-court-to-overturn-roe-v-wade [https://
perma.cc/49M8-EJWS].
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will opt not for Thayerian deference 53 to political decision-makers, but will instead aggressively impose its will. Last Term’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 54 which dealt a crippling blow
to public-sector unions, may provide a blueprint for how an emboldened majority might advance conservative interests using aggressive new doctrines—including the “weaponiz[ed]” First Amendment, as Justice Kagan put it in dissent. 55
To be sure, it is easy to overstate the likely pace and scope of legal change.
Among the conservative Justices, Chief Justice Roberts has displayed institutionalist leanings that seem in some cases to push back against his ideological conservatism. 56 He famously voted to uphold the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act against a constitutional challenge in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius 57 under the taxing power—in some accounts,
switching his vote after initially siding with his conservative colleagues to overturn the law on Commerce Clause grounds. 58 His decision may be partly explained by a desire to avoid exhausting the Court’s political capital by striking
down a Democratic President’s signature legislative accomplishment. 59 Even if

53.

See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
54. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
55.

Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
56. See, e.g., Henry Gass, Why Chief Justice Roberts Is Moving to the Center of the Court, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2019/0326/Why
-Chief-Justice-Roberts-is-moving-to-the-center-of-the-court
[https://perma.cc/VA5BSVR2] (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts “has been consistently conservative” on important
issues, but that he also “has oscillated in a few recent cases, and appears more mindful of the
[C]ourt’s institutional role in American democracy”); Michael O’Donnell, John Roberts’s Biggest Test Is Yet to Come, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine
/archive/2019/03/john-roberts-biography-review/580453 [https://perma.cc/Z8BS-29US]
(“More than 13 years into his tenure as [C]hief [J]ustice, Roberts remains a serious man and
a person of brilliance who struggles, under increasing criticism from all sides, to balance his
loyalty to an institution with his commitment to an ideology.”).
57.

567 U.S. 519 (2012).
58. See JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND TURBULENT TIMES OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS 232-40 (2019); Joan Biskupic, The Inside Story of How John Roberts Negotiated to Save
Obamacare, CNN (Mar. 25, 2019, 4:35 PM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/21/politics
/john-roberts-obamacare-the-chief/index.html [https://perma.cc/AH8Z-V4JC].
59. To be sure, inside accounts do not make clear that Chief Justice Roberts actually changed his
views on any legal questions. In Biskupic’s account, the Justices did actually vote on the taxing
power issue initially in the case. See BISKUPIC, supra note 58, at 234. For an argument that Chief
Justice Roberts may not have actually changed his vote, see Mark Tushnet, “The Chief”—What
It Actually Tells Us About John Roberts’s Vote in the Initial ACA Case, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 30,
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this is not the best account of what actually happened in NFIB, the story is plausible because the Chief Justice seems to care about the Court’s institutional perception. And it is possible that the Chief Justice’s institutionalism could cause
him to avoid, or at least delay, the most radical changes the Court could pursue.
That said, the Chief Justice has not shied away from broad, aggressive rulings in
some highly ideological cases—such as Janus, mentioned above, or Shelby County
v. Holder, 60 which rendered Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act inoperable. Thus,
while Chief Justice Roberts might not move as aggressively as some of his colleagues, there is no reason to assume he will ultimately stand in the way of the
Court’s rightward shift.
In a world where the public had great conﬁdence in the Supreme Court’s
fairness and impartiality, many Americans might accept controversial decisions
even if they did not agree with the results. Indeed, social-science research has
found some evidence for the proposition that the Supreme Court is more effective than other institutions at legitimizing unpopular decisions. 61 Yet in a world
where much of the public has lost faith in the idea that the Justices are fair and
impartial—and increasingly see them as politicians in robes—it is doubtful that
the public will accept unpopular decisions. Though the point is contested, there
is support for the view that the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is strongly tied up
with perceptions of how the Court makes decisions—particularly, whether the
public believes the Court uses fair procedures and is impartial in its decisionmaking. 62 Moreover, if the Court’s most salient decisions are almost universally
victories for one party, the Court’s legitimacy may be affected much more than
if its controversial rulings sometimes favored the other party.63 That is especially
2019), https://www.balkin.blogspot.com/2019/03/the-chief-what-it-actually-tells-us.html
[https://perma.cc/6TEX-8F46].
60.

133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
See James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and
Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 480-81 (1989) (ﬁnding, based on responses to
surveys, “some evidence of the Court’s capacity to engender compliance with unpopular political decisions”).
62. See Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
621, 627 (1991) (concluding that the “legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court is based on the
belief that it makes decisions in fair ways, not on agreement with its decisions”). For legitimacy purposes, of course, what matters is not whether the Court is actually impartial or using
fair procedures, but whether the public perceives that to be the case.
63. Cf. James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the US Supreme Court: Conventional
Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 201, 209 (2014) (noting
that “[l]ack of polarization [in perceptions of Supreme Court legitimacy] may also reﬂect the
fact that the Supreme Court is currently making about 50% of its decisions in a conservative
direction and 50% in a liberal direction”).
61.
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so where the most high-proﬁle cases are likely to be decided along party lines,
with Republican-appointed Justices in the majority and Democratic-appointed
Justices in dissent.
The Court’s legitimacy also faces threats from potential Democratic responses to Republicans’ aggressive tactics. Facing the prospect that the conservative majority could block progressive legislative efforts, many on the left are already trying to identify strategies that would reduce the Court’s power or disrupt
Republican control of its decision-making.
Perhaps most prominently, court-packing is under serious discussion after
being seen as beyond the pale for decades. 64 Although Congress has enlarged
and decreased the Court’s size at various points in history, often for nakedly political reasons, 65 the Court’s membership has been set at nine for over a century.
Famously, President Roosevelt advanced a plan to add Justices to the Court after
facing prominent losses for his New Deal agenda at the hands of a 5-4 conservative majority. Although the threat of court-packing alone may have been sufficient to deter the Court from striking down more New Deal programs, President
Roosevelt’s plan was defeated. 66 That defeat was politically costly; as Richard
Pildes has observed, “FDR’s legislative assault on the Court destroyed his political coalition, in Congress and nationally, and ended his ability to enact major
domestic policy legislation, despite his huge electoral triumph in 1936.” 67 In the
near century since, court-packing has been treated as a political third rail—making the Court’s current size look like an entrenched, quasiconstitutional norm.68

64.

See, e.g., Blake, supra note 5; Klarman, supra note 5; Samuel, supra note 5.
In 1863, in the midst of the Civil War, Congress expanded the size of the Court from nine to
ten Justices, a move that helped shore up support for Republican, pro-Union interests on the
Court. Timothy Huebner, The First Court-packing Plan, SCOTUSBLOG (July 3, 2013),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/07/the-ﬁrst-court-packing-plan
[https://perma.cc
/G7SR-W2ZB]. Then, during the presidency of Andrew Johnson, Congress reduced the
Court’s membership to seven—preventing President Johnson from appointing any Justices—
before expanding it back to nine after he left office. Id. The size of the Court has remained at
nine since then. Id.
66. For a fascinating history of this episode, see JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (2010).
67. Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103,
132.
68. See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 276-78 (2017); Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and
Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 505 (2018).
65.
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Now, progressives are questioning that conventional wisdom, arguing that adding seats to the Court would be a justiﬁed response to Senate Republicans’ theft
of a Supreme Court seat from President Obama. 69
Alternatives to court-packing are also under active discussion. Samuel Moyn
has argued that the left should “stand up for reforms that will take the last word
from [the Court].” 70 He points to jurisdiction-stripping statutes as well as
“[o]ther changes in customs and precedent” that could “weaken judicial supremacy,” and push the Court to “evolve into an advisory body, especially when the
[J]ustices disagree.” 71 Mark Tushnet has been advancing arguments for abolishing judicial review for a number of years, 72 and his proposals are receiving renewed interest. 73
The idea of court-packing is no mere academic fantasy. A number of Democratic presidential candidates have indicated support for expanding the Court’s
size, 74 or for other reforms. 75 There is no guarantee that Democrats will obtain
the necessary control over Congress and the Presidency to make them possible.
But the fact that people are discussing such ideas tells us how serious the situation is. The Court’s legitimacy will be questioned in the coming years—perhaps

69.

See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 5; see also infra Section III.B.3.
Samuel Moyn, Resisting the Juristocracy, BOS. REV. (Oct. 5, 2018), http://bostonreview.net
/law-justice/samuel-moyn-resisting-juristocracy [https://perma.cc/E4M6-6EP2].
71. Id.
70.

72.
73.

See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154-76 (2000).
See Sean Illing, The Case for Abolishing the Supreme Court, VOX (Oct. 12, 2018, 8:10 AM EDT),
https://www.vox.com/2018/10/12/17950896/supreme-court-brett-kavanaugh-constitution
[https://perma.cc/U6GM-N9QN].

74.

See Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, 2020 Dems Warm to Expanding Supreme Court, POLIT(Mar. 18, 2019, 5:04 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/18/2020
-democrats-supreme-court-1223625 [https://perma.cc/BWG3-M495].
75. Some candidates have endorsed an eighteen-year term limit proposal. See, e.g., Voting Rights,
BETO FOR AM., https://betoorourke.com/votingrights [https://perma.cc/HD23-D7UC]. One
candidate thus far has endorsed one of the proposals advanced in this article. See Josh Lederman, Inside Pete Buttigieg’s Plan to Overhaul the Supreme Court, NBC NEWS (June 3, 2019, 6:03
AM EDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/inside-pete-buttigieg-s-plan
-overhaul-supreme-court-n1012491 [https://perma.cc/Z97M-22J7] (discussing Buttigieg’s
support of the Balanced Bench). Another has suggested reforms that accord with the other
proposal. See Justin Wise, Bernie Sanders Says He Would Move to ‘Rotate’ Supreme Court Justices
if Elected, THE HILL (June 27, 2019, 10:45 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign
/450800-bernie-sanders-says-he-would-move-to-rotate-supreme-court-justices-if [https://
perma.cc/WAP2-U3FA] (mentioning a plan akin to the Supreme Court Lottery).
ICO
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as never before. Indeed, even those who think the threat might be overblown
still believe that coming challenges to the Court need to be taken seriously. 76
ii. why s ave the court?
There is clear cause for concern about the looming threat to the Supreme
Court’s legitimacy. A Supreme Court that is viewed as illegitimate by a signiﬁcant portion of the American people will be less able to settle important questions,
and particularly less able to exercise the power of judicial review. Of course, for
many on the left today, that may seem like a desirable goal. Those who favor
Moyn’s critique of “juristocracy,” for example, or who are drawn to Tushnet’s
arguments against judicial review, would likely welcome developments that
would weaken the Court’s ability to stand up to the other branches of government.
On one level, we have sympathy for some of these critiques. Judicial review
is inescapably antidemocratic. 77 And while it has served important purposes at
key moments in American history, it is also a power that the Court has abused.
At a minimum, most observers would agree the Justices have sometimes taken
on responsibility for resolving thorny questions that would have been better left
to elected officials—even if there is little consensus about which uses of judicial
review prove the point. 78
76.

See Ilya Somin, Is the Supreme Court Going to Suffer a Crisis of Legitimacy?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Oct. 10, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/10/10/is-the-supreme-court
-going-to-suffer-a-c [https://perma.cc/UJ72-LNNR] (arguing that predictions of a legitimacy crisis “may well be overblown, as they often have been in the past” but that “[t]he deep
anger of much of the left could lead to a stronger assault on the Court than has occurred in a
long time”).
77. This critique is most famously associated with Alexander Bickel. See BICKEL, supra note 29.
Since Bickel posed the “countermajoritarian difficulty,” constitutional theorists have gone to
great lengths to try to reconcile judicial review with majority rule. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (offering a theory of “representation reinforcement” under which judicial review protects and enables democratic governance); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1014 (1984) (noting that the countermajoritarian difficulty is “the starting point for contemporary analysis of judicial review”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 71 (1989) (“Most constitutional scholars for the past quartercentury have accepted Bickel’s deﬁnition of the problem and have seen the task of constitutional theory as deﬁning a role for the Court that is consistent with majoritarian principles.”).
78.
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Liberals might point to The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905); and, more recently, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); and Shelby County
v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). Conservatives might point to cases like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and
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Nonetheless, we have deep reservations about the long-term consequences
of a powerless Supreme Court. First, if the Supreme Court suddenly became unable to exercise judicial review, the American constitutional system would look
signiﬁcantly different. Such a development would not spell the end of American
democracy. Indeed, countries like England, the Netherlands, and Canada either
lack written constitutions, do not permit courts to enforce their written constitutions through judicial review, or have mechanisms by which the legislature can
(at least in theory) reenact laws that the courts have struck down. 79 These examples suggest that it is possible to have a well-functioning democracy that respects individual rights without giving courts the ﬁnal word over the constitutionality of legislation. Moreover, the Supreme Court itself barely exercised
judicial review of federal statutes during the nation’s early years, doing so only
twice before the Civil War. 80
But even if other democracies function well without judicial review, it doesn’t
follow that our own system would function equally well if the Court’s power to
check the political branches were abolished or signiﬁcantly curtailed. Whatever
its merits, judicial review has been a longstanding and integral part of the American constitutional system. No one can know what would happen if it disappeared tomorrow. Perhaps the political branches would, more or less, safeguard
basic rights, the way legislatures do in other democracies. But perhaps political
actors have become so accustomed to being reined in by courts that, once set free,
they would trample important rights. On this point, it bears note that in some
of the cases where the Supreme Court is thought to have erred most grievously,
it is because the Court failed to exercise the power of judicial review and defend
individual rights from political actors. 81
Ultimately, however, the implications for judicial review are secondary concerns when it comes to the Supreme Court’s legitimacy. The larger problem is
this: the Supreme Court plays a signiﬁcant role in the public imagination as a
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). There are some examples which could command
agreement across the political spectrum—most obviously, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857). For an argument that Dred Scott may have been correctly decided as a purely
legal (but certainly not a moral) matter, see MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM
OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).
79.

For a discussion, see Mark Tushnet, Dialogic Judicial Review, 61 ARK. L. REV. 205 (2009); and
Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781 (2003).

80.

The cases were Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803); and Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393.

81.

As Jamal Greene has observed, the constitutional “anticanon” includes Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896); and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)—two cases where the
Court declined to stop the government from engaging in racial discrimination. See Jamal
Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 378, 387 (2011).
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citadel of justice. For many Americans, given the Supreme Court’s salience, faith
in the Court may be deeply intertwined with feelings about the very idea of law.82
In a world where the Supreme Court is widely seen as just another political institution, how will people think about law itself? Our fear is that in such a world,
the very idea of law as an enterprise separate from politics will evaporate.
The rule of law is a critical element of a healthy democracy. If it erodes, our
fears for democracy become more concrete. Can a democratic society long survive if the citizenry loses faith in law? Will the notion of the rule of law survive
if people stop believing that judges are doing something other than exercising
political will when deciding cases? Will political actors cease to give credence to
the results of any legal proceeding that does not validate their preexisting beliefs?
We do not know the answers to these questions. But we are not eager to run the
experiment required to answer them. Instead, we think it is imperative to save
the Supreme Court as an institution above the political fray.
Saving the Court, however, will require changing the Court. Our current system is deeply ﬂawed, and events since 2016 have only exposed problems that
were long lurking below the surface. The consequences of individual Supreme
Court appointments are so signiﬁcant that political actors will naturally ﬁght for
them tooth and nail. These ﬂaws were less apparent in an age when the leading
political parties were less polarized. But now, given extreme ideological sorting,
politicians of both parties realize the stakes of Supreme Court appointments and
are ﬁrmly committed to staffing the Court with ideological comrades. 83
A number of observers will no doubt argue that the solution to this legitimacy crisis is to simply reject the challenge and treat the Court as legitimate. Yet
things are not so simple. The new Supreme Court majority is arguably the most
reliably conservative in history, and there is reason to believe it will strike down
laws that progressives favor using doctrinal theories that are at least open to serious question—as the Court has already done in cases like Shelby County 84 and
Janus. 85 And given that Democrats have a reasonable argument that the conservative majority was earned using underhanded tactics, 86 it is not clear why
they should feel compelled to let the Court block their favored policies for a generation or more in deference to the Court’s institutional legitimacy. Instead,
given these high stakes, it seems to us inevitable that the Court’s legitimacy will

82.

Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2242 (1997)
(noting that the Supreme Court is “the most salient symbol of the rule of law in our society”).

83.

See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).

84.
85.
86.
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be challenged head-on. To avoid that collision, we need to change course—radically.
The next two Parts explain what we think that course change should—and
should not—look like. Before doing so, though, we must stress one point. At this
moment, Supreme Court reform unquestionably feels most pressing to those on
the ideological left, given conservative control of the Court. By the same token,
conservatives might feel no urgency, given the major victories they anticipate the
Court handing down. We think, however, that whoever beneﬁts immediately,
the right kind of Supreme Court reform is ultimately in both sides’ long-term
interests. Preserving a Supreme Court that is not merely a partisan institution is
more important than winning on policy issues in the short term.
iii. how (not) to save the court
Saving what is good about the Court will require signiﬁcant reform to how
the Court operates and how the Justices are selected. But not just any reform will
do. In this Part, we ﬁrst develop a framework for successful Supreme Court reform. We then discuss how previous reform proposals fall short and could even
exacerbate the problems reform should seek to resolve.
A. Desiderata for Reform
The reform that we envision would have multiple, overlapping goals. At the
outset, however, we should clearly deﬁne the problem. As we see it, a key problem with how the Supreme Court works today is that its design makes it possible
for political parties to capture control over the institution using bare-knuckle
tactics, leading to the apocalyptic conﬁrmation battles we have seen in recent
years. Such conﬂicts were not foreseen at the Founding—perhaps because no one
envisioned just how powerful the Court would become, but certainly because
the Founders did not anticipate how political parties would shape appointments
to the Court. 87 Even well after the rise of political parties, the problems with the
Court’s structure were not fully apparent because judicial ideology did not consistently track party affiliation. Today, however, with the rise of polarized schools
87.

See ABRAHAM, supra note 11, at 20 (“[T]he Founding Fathers . . . did not foresee the role political parties would soon come to play in the appointment process.”); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE
FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (2005); see also Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006) (arguing that “[t]he
Framers had not anticipated the nature of the democratic competition that would emerge in
government and in the electorate” because they did not foresee the role political parties would
play).
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of legal interpretation, polarized elite communities of lawyers, and a polarized
political culture, party domination of the Court has become an attainable goal—
and thus one that politicians will ﬁght hard to achieve. And that, in turn, increasingly distorts our politics, as voters make decisions in presidential elections in
order to shape the composition of the Supreme Court. 88
Reform that would change this dynamic has several components. First, it
would be designed to preserve the Court as an institution that is not partisan—
or, at the very least, as an institution that is less partisan than other branches.
That means structuring the system so that partisan politicians are less able to
capture the Court by stacking it with ideological fellow travelers. It is precisely
because the Court is able to be captured that battles for control have become so
damaging and toxic as our politics have become more polarized.
Second (and related to that goal), reform would signiﬁcantly reduce the political stakes of nominating individual Justices, to avoid spectacles like those of
recent years. That also means signiﬁcantly lessening the importance of individual Justices. In our current system, far too much turns on essentially random
events. Any one Justice’s death or retirement can have massive consequences for
the law and thus for American society, depending on when the vacancy occurs
and which party controls the Senate. This is not a sensible way to run a constitutional democracy. Whatever one’s views on abortion, free speech, gay marriage,
or the powers of Congress, important governmental decisions on these matters
should not depend on the health of individual octogenarians. No one would design such a system from scratch, and any good set of reforms would endeavor to
make the Court less sensitive to the choices and health of individual Justices. A
positive byproduct of this reform is that it would reduce the cult of personality
around the Justices, which may currently be pushing them to become even more
partisan. 89
Third, a better system would preserve some ability for the Justices to strike
down laws while also nudging them in the direction of deference to the political
branches. In our view, some role for judicial review is important, so that the
Court can hold the nation to its deepest commitments and check its worst injustices. But there are good arguments that Justices on both sides of the ideological
88.

See Jane Coaston, Polling Data Shows Republicans Turned out for Trump in 2016 Because of the
Supreme Court, VOX (June 29, 2018, 10:00 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/29
/17511088/scotus-2016-election-poll-trump-republicans-kennedy-retire [https://perma.cc
/8YZF-NEPX] (“One of the most underappreciated reasons that Donald Trump won the 2016
election was voters motivated by a vacancy on the Supreme Court. One in ﬁve voters told
CNN in an exit poll that the Supreme Court was one reason they had cast a ballot.”).

89.

See Suzanna Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and How to Fix It) (July 24, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3425998.
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divide have become too eager to exercise this power in recent decades. 90 A sensible reform would provide a thumb on the scale in the direction of deference.
These are the goals we have designed our proposed reforms to satisfy. But
sensible reforms would satisfy other practical criteria as well. Any signiﬁcant
change to the way the Supreme Court works will create immediate winners and
losers. Given that Republicans are currently enjoying the beneﬁts of a conservative Supreme Court, they are unlikely to support efforts to signiﬁcantly reform
the Court. For this reason, any reform proposal should be capable of implementation via statute, rather than constitutional amendment, in the event that Democrats are able to capture control of Congress and the White House. That limitation is signiﬁcant but necessary. Given the polarization of society, the stakes of
control over the Supreme Court, and the relative distribution of partisan affiliation within and across the United States, it is very hard to imagine that a constitutional amendment changing the structure of the Supreme Court could pass in
the near term. 91
Related to that point, any statutory reform proposal should also be plausibly
constitutional. Not obviously or undebatably constitutional, but at least plausibly so. Indeed, for the right kind of reform, we are willing to accept constitutional arguments that are less than bulletproof. There is, to be sure, a signiﬁcant
risk that the Supreme Court itself would strike down reform on constitutional
grounds, and for that reason one might think only the constitutionally soundest
proposals should be put forward. The conservative majority on the Court would
likely be skeptical of reforms that would reduce the Court’s power, especially if
such efforts lacked bipartisan support. Yet this argument ignores the fact that if
the Supreme Court rejects moderate reform, more serious threats to its power
and legitimacy will be lurking in the background—jurisdiction-stripping, courtpacking, and perhaps even outright deﬁance of Court judgments by the political
branches. Such threats could be implicit or explicit. For example, a reform statute might contain a severability clause stating that the Court would be packed
with ﬁve new Justices, or that its jurisdiction would be removed, in the event
that the reform proposal were struck down. Under such circumstances, the
Court might blink before striking down a reform measure as unconstitutional.92
90.
91.

92.

See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 72.
We recognize that even a statutory proposal may be difficult to pass politically, but it remains
far easier than a constitutional amendment. For discussion, see Adrian Vermeule, Political
Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1154 (2006).
This analysis presupposes that the current Supreme Court would hear a constitutional challenge to a reform measure, but that is not obvious; if the reform were put into place, and new
Justices seated, it is unclear exactly which Court—the current or reformed—would hear the
challenge.
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In addition, it is not obvious that the Court would accept supposedly “rock-solid”
constitutional arguments. One strength of the case for Court expansion, for example, is its constitutionality; but there are commentators who believe even it
would be unconstitutional. 93 The Court’s conservatives might side with the
skeptics, given the desire to retain their majority.
Finally, the resulting system must be at least potentially stable—it must be
an arrangement that both political parties could live with going forward. This
might seem inconsistent with what we have said thus far: that reform would
need to be enacted via statute, largely along party lines, and potentially using
aggressive tactics in order to dissuade the Supreme Court from declaring it unconstitutional. How could such a reform lead to any kind of stable equilibrium
going forward?
Here, we can distinguish between means and ends. As David Pozen has explained, it is possible to imagine “hardball” tactics (deﬁned as conduct that “violates or strains constitutional conventions for partisan ends” or that “attempts
to shift settled understandings of the Constitution in an unusually aggressive or
self-entrenching manner”) to accomplish what he calls anti-hardball goals. 94
“Anti-hardball policies” in Pozen’s account “forestall or foreclose tit-for-tat cycles and lower the temperature of political disputes.” 95 Even if aggressive hardball tactics are used, it is at least possible to imagine them creating a system that
has no obvious ideological valence going forward and which both sides could
live with. Necessarily, though, such reforms must reﬂect “‘good-government’
rules that both sides would prefer to adopt, if they had to write the rules under
a veil of ignorance.” 96 Properly designed reforms could satisfy this criterion—
even if they were initially adopted by hardball, party-line tactics.
B. How Existing Proposals Shape Up
On the criteria identiﬁed above, prior proposals to reform the Supreme
Court or the nomination process fall short. This Section considers several in
turn.

93.
94.

95.
96.
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1. Term Limits
Perhaps the most popular reform proposal involves setting term limits for
Supreme Court Justices. In the best-known variation, Justices would serve an
eighteen-year term. 97
First proposed in a student note, 98 the plan is most famously associated with
Roger Cramton and Paul Carrington. 99 Under this proposal, every President
would make two appointments to the Court during each four-year presidential
term. The plan would make appointments more predictable, removing the pressure to stack the Court with younger and younger Justices.
This is a well-intentioned proposal. But it does not satisfy our criteria for
reform—most importantly because it is unlikely to depoliticize the Court or turn
down the temperature of the nominations process. Indeed, if anything, it will
make the politicization of the Court even worse by increasing the Court’s prominence in every election cycle.
An initial problem, though, is that it may not be possible to implement term
limits via statute alone. Constitutional scholars—even some who wish to eliminate lifetime tenure—have argued that the clause in Article III giving Justices a
term for “good behavior” indicates a lifetime appointment. 100 While there are
arguments that “good behavior” can coexist with a term-of-years appointment,
they rest on comparatively weak grounds. 101 For these reasons, the plan’s origi-

97.

See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006); Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme
Court, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1323-24 (2007); Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington, The
Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Return to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 467 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds.,
2006); James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Note, Saving this Honorable Court: A Proposal to
Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year Terms, 90
VA. L. REV. 1093 (2004); see also Linda Greenhouse, New Focus on the Effects of Life Tenure, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/washington/10scotus.html
[https://perma.cc/H2Q8-8KHJ].

98.

See DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 97.
See Cramton & Carrington, supra note 97.

99.
100.

See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 97, at 824; Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How
to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 90 (2006) (“[B]y the end of the eighteenth century,
a simple grant of good-behavior tenure might also be considered ‘tenure for life’ or ‘life tenure.’”); David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a Golden Parachute,
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397, 1404-08 (2005).
101. Stras & Scott, supra note 100, at 1405 (addressing this argument).
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nal proponents, James DiTullio and John Schochet, explicitly framed their proposal as requiring a constitutional amendment. 102 That path would need significant Republican support, which seems highly unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Cramton and Carrington, though, offer a version of the plan that they contend could be implemented via statute. In their proposal, Congress would pass
a statute giving each President one Supreme Court appointment after each federal election. Justices who served longer than eighteen years would not lose their
commissions, but would instead effectively serve in a senior-status role, sitting
only when one of the nine most junior Justices (i.e., those appointed within the
last eighteen years) was unable to participate in a case. 103 This version of the
proposal strikes us as more constitutionally plausible (i.e., capable of implementation by statute) than a true term-limit requirement, though some would certainly argue it does not pass muster.
Constitutional issues aside, however, the deeper problem is that the proposal
would likely make the Supreme Court more political. The proposal guarantees
that the Supreme Court will be a campaign issue in every presidential election
because voters would know with certainty that the next President would get to
shape the Court with two nominees. It would also be a campaign issue in every
midterm election, so long as control of the Senate is within striking distance for
either party. Given the stakes, partisans and their deep-pocketed allies would
make Court appointments an especially salient issue in battleground Senate
races. And even with this plan, activists on both sides would still jockey to make
sure only the purest ideologues were appointed.
Then, once on the bench, the Justices themselves might become more political. A term-limited Justice might see the Court as the perfect jumping-off point
for a presidential run, decide cases in hopes of retiring into a lucrative lobbying
gig, or play to the public to secure a future on Fox News or MSNBC. 104 As David
Stras and Ryan Scott argue, “ﬁxed, nonrenewable terms . . . introduce incentives
for Supreme Court Justices to cast votes in a way that improves their prospects

102.

DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 97, at 1097 (“Ending life tenure would require a constitutional
amendment.”).
103. Cramton & Carrington, supra note 97, at 471.
104.
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for future employment outside the judiciary.” 105 This is a major, underappreciated drawback to the eighteen-year-term proposal.106
2. Panels
Another proposal, from Tracey George and Chris Guthrie, is to expand the
Supreme Court to the size of a court of appeals, and then have Justices hear cases
in panels with the opportunity for en banc review. 107 George and Guthrie’s
stated aim is to expand the Court’s docket in order to solve the problem of it
hearing too few cases. 108 This proposal could potentially tamp down the politicization of the Court, in that the Court would have many more Justices and panels would be randomly selected.
One problem, though, is that Court appointments—particularly in the transition period to this system—would remain highly politicized. Moreover, there
is a risk that the Court would simply vote to take all the politically charged cases
en banc. If so, the proposal would provide no beneﬁts in terms of reduced politicization. Indeed, there is a chance the Court could become more political as well:
a Court that is able to take on a larger docket would have more opportunities for
ideological activism.
3. Court-Packing
There has been a surprising degree of interest in expanding the size of the
Court to include additional Justices. One of the virtues of this proposal is that it
is almost certainly implementable by statute, as the size of the Supreme Court is
not speciﬁed in the Constitution and has always been set by statute. Congress
has changed the size of the Court at various times, sometimes for nakedly partisan reasons. 109

105.

Stras & Scott, supra note 100, at 1425.

106.

The only possible solution (one suggested to us by Richard Primus) would be to introduce a
legal requirement forbidding retired Justices from being employed, or otherwise earning income, in any other position, in government or in the private sector, after their judicial service.
Such a broad prohibition would raise a number of issues we cannot address here.
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Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1442 (2009).
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The Court’s size has, however, remained at nine members since 1870. 110
President Roosevelt’s failed attempt to expand the Court in the 1930s has led
many to conclude that the Court’s size is now a settled constitutional norm. 111
For example, Richard Primus (responding to a proposal for Republicans to pack
the lower courts for nakedly political reasons) 112 argues that such measures are
“not constitutional in the small-c sense of the term” because they “depart[] from
long-settled norms and understandings about how American government is
conducted.” 113
Yet, from another perspective, court-packing could be the appropriate response by Democrats to Republicans’ violation of norms. Michael Klarman recently argued the case for court-packing, stressing not only the circumstances of
the last two nominations, but also the fact that Republicans are systemically “abrogat[ing] a basic principle of democracy—when you lose in politics, sometimes
you have to just admit defeat.” 114 Instead, Klarman argues, they are changing
the rules of politics—from voter suppression to restricting the powers of Democratic governors. 115 Klarman thus contends that Democrats should not “unilateral[ly] disarm[],” but instead need to pack the courts in order to restore and
protect the basic infrastructure of democracy. 116
At ﬁrst glance, court-packing plans appear to be the kind of reform that
might lead to greater politicization and delegitimization of the Court. If Democrats pack the Court, the argument goes, Republicans will return the favor when
they are next in power and pack the Court further in response. On this approach,
court-packing is politically inﬂammatory and unstable. Yet as Tushnet has ob-

110.

AMAR, supra note 109, at 353.

111.

Bradley and Siegel, for example, suggest that court-packing might violate a norm derived
from historical practice. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 68; Grove, supra note 68. Others
think that court-packing violates a separation-of-powers convention. David E. Pozen, SelfHelp and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 34 (2014). Some, however, are not convinced:
Amar concludes that changing the Court’s size would be constitutional if done for good-government reasons. AMAR, supra note 109, at 353-55.

112.

See Memorandum from Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji to the Senate and House of Representatives (Nov. 7, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/calabresi
-court-packing-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4FR-UT3R].
113. Richard Primus, Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and Endgames: A Constitutional Analysis of the Calabresi-Hirji Judgeship Proposal, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), https://blog
.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of
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served, “there are numerous difficulties with this informal game-theoretic argument.” 117 It is difficult to determine what the different “rounds” of the game are,
and “[w]hen rounds of play are separated by long periods of time, the actual
people who play against each other can be quite different . . . .” 118 More concretely, we can imagine conditions under which court-packing could lead to a
stable equilibrium, without an ever-escalating cycle of political retaliation.
Throughout American history, there have been moments in which major upheavals have realigned politics (and constitutional politics) to a new equilibrium. 119 If Democrats engaged in court-packing and were able to hold power for
long enough to implement policies to revive basic principles of democracy—such
as voter-access and anti-gerrymandering reforms—perhaps this polarized era
would give way to a new progressive equilibrium.
That said, it is certainly conceivable that no such new equilibrium would
emerge, and instead each party would expand the Court whenever it had uniﬁed
control of the political branches. If court-packing produced that result, it would
almost certainly delegitimize the Court—and possibly the entire enterprise of
law. Thus, while court-packing’s great strength is that it is almost certainly constitutional, it could worsen our predicament. Moreover, even if successful, the
battle to pack the Court, if resting on purely partisan grounds, could prove a
pyrrhic victory. As noted, President Roosevelt’s failed court-packing plan essentially destroyed his ability to pass progressive legislation afterward. 120 While any
attempt to reform the Supreme Court will require signiﬁcant political capital,
nakedly partisan court-packing might be especially costly.
4. Jurisdiction-Stripping
Another possible reform to curb the Supreme Court’s power is jurisdictionstripping. Moyn, for example, has suggested that a future Democratic-controlled

117.
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Mark Tushnet, , 45 PEPP. L. REV. 481, 500 (2018).
Id. at 500-01.
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The classic account comes from Bruce Ackerman. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUN(1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000). Drawing
on his idea of constitutional time, Jack Balkin has argued that President Trump represents the
end of one era of politics and that a new era could be on the horizon. Jack Balkin, What Kind
of President Will Trump Become, Part II—Donald Trump and the Politics of Disjunction,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 14, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/11/what-kind-of
-president-will-trump.html [https://perma.cc/2HTR-ACJ5].
120. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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Congress should seek to “bar the judiciary from considering cases on certain topics such as abortion or affirmative action.” 121 This approach could produce
short-term beneﬁts for one side, by preventing the courts from striking down
laws in areas where a Democratic-controlled Congress prefers the status quo. 122
Congress could also introduce speciﬁc jurisdiction-stripping provisions as part
of policy reforms. Congress might, say, insulate a health-care-reform bill from
judicial challenge by including a provision stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the new law.
Yet jurisdiction-stripping poses a number of problems. First, it seems unlikely to create a stable equilibrium. As Gregory Koger argues, this strategy
“would legitimize similar actions by the other party when the political pendulum
swings. A Republican Congress could, for example, pass a law banning abortion
that excluded constitutional challenges to the bill from the Court’s jurisdiction.” 123 Such escalation might ultimately result in a Court with little formal
power or public legitimacy.
Moreover, jurisdiction-stripping proposals also lack what is often thought of
as the leading advantage of court-packing: a strong claim to constitutionality.
Indeed, the constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping proposals remains one of
the most signiﬁcant unanswered questions in the ﬁeld of federal courts. 124 A jurisdiction-stripping bill could thus provoke an unprecedented showdown between the political branches and the judiciary, where the courts would get to
weigh in on whether their jurisdiction had permissibly been stripped. At least in
terms of public opinion, the judiciary might well have the upper hand in such a
conﬂict. Given the Supreme Court’s perceived role as a protector of rights in

121.
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Moyn, supra note 70.
It is not clear how limiting the judiciary’s ability to hear cases involving abortion would be in
Democrats’ interest, given that under the status quo courts step in to protect abortion rights
from state laws. Jurisdiction-stripping seems like a more effective strategy when applied to
subject areas where courts threaten to limit progressive government action (such as affirmative
action).

Gregory Koger, How a Democratic Congress Can Push Back Against the Supreme Court, VOX
(Nov. 12, 2018, 9:30 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2018/11/12
/18080622/democratic-congress-against-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/KTM8-JMCN].
124. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1045
(2010) (“For better or for worse, many of the most mooted of those questions [about jurisdiction-stripping proposals] remain unanswered.”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality
of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure,
98 VA. L. REV 839, 839-40 (2012) (“[T]here is one [question] in particular that has puzzled
scholars unlike any other: whether Congress can withhold all federal jurisdiction . . . in a case
raising a federal constitutional claim.”).
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American society, many Americans might feel uneasy about a law that sought to
shut the courthouse doors entirely for an important class of cases.
5. Senate-Based Reform
One ﬁnal set of proposals revolves around the Senate. Changes to the Senate’s rules, as well as to norms for how nominations are handled, could avoid the
damaging partisan battles of recent years, some argue. One common proposal is
to restore the ﬁlibuster for Supreme Court nominees in the wake of Senate Republicans’ use of the “nuclear option” in 2017. This would, supposedly, “encourage bipartisan consensus and . . . prod [P]residents to nominate broadly acceptable candidates.” 125 Senate Democrats themselves have suggested restoring
the ﬁlibuster for Supreme Court nominees if they returned to power. 126
The appeal of such proposals is easy to understand. The nomination process
has signiﬁcantly deteriorated in recent years and reached a new low point in
2017—after Senate Republicans eliminated the ﬁlibuster for Supreme Court
nominations and enabled President Trump to pick two committed conservatives.
Perhaps restoring the ﬁlibuster is the key to getting Presidents to pick moderates
who could earn broad support.
Yet Senate-based reform presents a number of problems. First, such reform
would be difficult to make permanent. One writer suggested reimplementing a
sixty-vote threshold based solely on an agreement by a group of moderate senators, 127 but such a handshake agreement would not be guaranteed to last past
the next election. The Senate could vote to change its own rules to reinstate the

125.

Editorial, Brett Kavanaugh Will Be Our Next Supreme Court Justice for All the Wrong Reasons,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-kavanaugh
-hearings-20180907-story.html [https://perma.cc/28ZK-XSGS]; see also Jennifer Rubin,
Opinion, How to Fix the Supreme Court Without Packing It, WASH. POST (July 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com /blogs/right-turn/wp/2018/07 /05/the-case-against
-court-packing [https://perma.cc/BNW3-47L3] (“Polls show voters overwhelmingly want to
use a 60-vote minimum—one that forces a nomination of someone with widespread or at
least wider-spread acceptance.”).

126.

See Jordain Carney, Dem Senator Says His Party Will Restore 60-Vote Supreme Court Filibuster,
THE HILL (Apr. 10, 2017, 3:57 PM EDT), https://thehill.com/blogs/ﬂoor-action/senate
/328161-dem-senator-democrats-will-restore-60-vote-supreme-court-ﬁlibuster
[https://
perma.cc/WEA2-9XJ9]; Sam Stein & Amanda Terkel, Democrats Contemplate How to Forfeit
Their Power upon Regaining the Senate, HUFFPOST (Apr. 10, 2017, 4:42 PM ET), https://
www.huffpost.com/entry/democrats-discuss-restoring-ﬁlibuster_n_58ebdfa3e4b0ca64d91848e4 [https://perma.cc/X2LF-N37B].
127. See Rubin, supra note 125.
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ﬁlibuster, but the next Senate could just change the rules back once more. Perhaps Congress could pass a statute requiring the Senate to use a supermajority
voting rule to end debate on Supreme Court nominations. A statute would be
harder to change, given that doing so would require assent of both Houses of
Congress; but it would raise serious constitutional concerns. 128
Moreover, even if restoring the ﬁlibuster actually caused Presidents to select
moderate nominees, additional changes would be needed to ﬁx a broken process.
Judge Garland was exactly the kind of moderate candidate who in normal circumstances might have been expected to earn support from enough senators to
overcome a ﬁlibuster. 129 But Senate Republicans would not even give him a
hearing. Thus, restoring the ﬁlibuster would also have to be accompanied by
some kind of rule change entitling nominees to actual consideration. 130 Even
that might not be sufficient, however, to ﬁx the problem of partisan escalation;
Senate Republicans presumably would have voted down Judge Garland even if
they had held a hearing.
More fundamentally, proposals for restoring the ﬁlibuster mistake a symptom for the disease. The elimination of the ﬁlibuster is not the source of what is
wrong with the Supreme Court nominations process. Instead, deeper problems
led to the demise of the ﬁlibuster: the increasing polarization of the parties, the
breakdown of norms and the use of constitutional hardball, the high stakes of
individual appointments, and so on. Simply bringing the ﬁlibuster back, or making other changes to Senate rules, does nothing to address the underlying problem.
In sum, none of the proposals currently on offer satisfy the desiderata for
reform we have identiﬁed. In the next Part, we offer two proposals that would
satisfy our criteria.

128.

For the leading treatment of the issues, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. &
POL. 345 (2003).
129. See Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why It Matters Now, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (June 28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened
-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now [https://perma.cc/Z5HU-3PBT]
(“Widely regarded as a moderate, Garland had been praised in the past by many Republicans.”).
130.
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Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a
Senate Conﬁrmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940 (2013) (arguing that Senate inaction on executivebranch nominees could be treated as consent, entitling the nominee to take office without a
conﬁrmation vote).
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iv. s aving the court: two proposals
Comprehensive reform is the key to saving the Supreme Court. We offer two
distinct proposals to illustrate how reform might be accomplished. In Section
IV.A, we propose the “Supreme Court Lottery,” a plan in which the Court would
sit in panels selected at random from a large pool of potential Justices who would
also serve as judges on the U.S. courts of appeals. In Section IV.B, we propose
the “Balanced Bench,” in which the Supreme Court would be composed of an
equal number of Democratic- and Republican-selected Justices, plus additional
Justices drawn from the circuit courts on whom the “partisan” Justices would
have to agree unanimously. While neither proposal eliminates every problem we
have identiﬁed, either would be a major improvement over the status quo. Signiﬁcantly, and unlike many other proposals, our two sets of reforms meet the
criteria we have outlined: they secure the Court’s role as an institution that is not
merely partisan; they lower the temperature of particular nominations; and they
expand deference to the political branches of government.
A. The Supreme Court Lottery
1. The Plan and Its Beneﬁts
We call our ﬁrst proposal the Supreme Court Lottery. Under this reform,
every judge on the federal courts of appeals would also be appointed as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court would hear cases as a
panel of nine, randomly selected from all the Justices. Once selected, the Justices
would research and prepare cases from their home chambers before traveling to
Washington to hear oral arguments for two weeks, after which another set of
judges would replace them. 131 The panel members would then return to their
home chambers to complete their opinions. By law, each panel would be prohibited from having more than ﬁve Justices nominated by a President of a single
political party (that is, no more than ﬁve Republicans or Democrats at a time).
131.

Our proposal is similar to that offered in John O. McGinnis, Justice Without Justices, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 541 (1999). McGinnis calls his proposal “Supreme Court riding,” and it differs
from ours in a few important ways. First, McGinnis imagines abolishing the office of Supreme
Court Justice overall (a proposal that requires a constitutional amendment). Id. at 541. We
instead propose expanding the number of Associate Justices, a reform that we think is constitutional because it is simply deciding the size of the Court. Second, McGinnis suggests that
the term of service for “riding” be six months to one year. Id. We propose two weeks, to further amplify the beneﬁts of a short rotation on the Court. Finally, we propose a supermajority
requirement and note that no more than ﬁve Justices on any panel can have been nominated
by a President of a single political party.
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In addition, only a 6-3 supermajority 132 of the Court, rather than a simple majority, could hold a federal statute (and possibly state statutes, 133 depending on
how one weighs federalism values) unconstitutional. 134
This reform would have signiﬁcant beneﬁts. First, it would signiﬁcantly depoliticize the appointments process by making conﬁrmations more numerous
and less consequential. New Justices would primarily serve on the courts of appeals, with only occasional elevation to a Supreme Court panel. More broadly,
contentious issues of public importance would no longer depend on unexpected
deaths, and Justices would no longer have the ability to shape constitutional law
for a generation by strategically timing their retirement. This would also free up
the President and Congress to do the work of governing instead of occasionally
putting that work aside for protracted conﬁrmation battles.
The Supreme Court Lottery would, however, make appointments to the federal courts of appeals more signiﬁcant, as these judges would constitute the “minor leagues” for the Supreme Court. But we think the concern that our reform
would overly politicize those appointments is relatively limited. Appointments
to the federal courts of appeals are already polarized, with Senate Republicans
132.

A supermajority rule would reduce the likelihood of one particularly unrepresentative panel
made up of ﬁve ideological extremists getting to set policy for the entire country. Even with a
6-3 supermajority requirement, however, there is still some chance of skewed panels. But our
prohibition on more than ﬁve judges having been appointed by a President of a single political
party should mitigate this concern even with a nine-Justice panel, because bipartisan support
would be a prerequisite for overturning a statute. For those particularly worried about this
problem, the supermajority requirement could be increased to 7-2 or panel size could be increased to, say, ﬁfteen, with an eleven- or even twelve-Justice supermajority required to declare a statute unconstitutional. For those concerned about adopting a partisan-balance requirement, that component could be removed, though it would increase the risk of instability
from ideological panels.

133.

We do not express a ﬁrm view on whether the supermajority requirement should apply to
decisions declaring state statutes unconstitutional. Given that federal statutes necessarily apply to the whole country, there are greater dangers in making it too easy for a skewed panel to
declare a federal statute unconstitutional. We also think that the Court should be more deferential to the political branches of government, particularly when issues divide along a partisan
axis. With respect to state laws, this latter concern is less applicable; though at the same time,
a central proposition of our constitutional system is the supremacy of federal constitutional
law over state statutes.

134.

This last change would also require establishing that if a lower court strikes down a federal
statute, the Supreme Court would have to hear the case. It would take a 6-3 vote for the statute
to be deemed unconstitutional, regardless of the lower court’s decision. This would solve the
problem of a federal court of appeals striking down a statute and the Supreme Court needing
only a bare majority to affirm that ruling when it would otherwise need a 6-3 margin to overturn the statute itself. Without this change, the proposal would perversely aggrandize the
power of lower courts. For a discussion, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule:
Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 957 (2003).
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currently working at high speed to ﬁll vacancies with young, ideological appointees. 135 This is precisely because they understand the importance of the courts of
appeals. Both sides, we expect, would engage in this behavior. Nonetheless, the
lower salience and higher volume of these appointments, in addition to the prohibition of more than ﬁve Justices nominated by a President of a single political
party, means they are less likely to become central to public debate. This would
be a positive development, as it would make the courts less of a political football
in elections and prevent the creation of cults of personality around the Justices.
Instead, the Court would be what it should be—a relatively anonymous group
of skilled, thoughtful jurists. 136
Second, we expect this approach would also decrease the ideological and idiosyncratic nature of Court decisions. No Justice would be able to advance an
ideological agenda over decades of service, and no Justice would be the single
swing voter over a period of years (and thus targeted by the lion’s share of advocacy). 137 In addition, it would be very difficult for a Justice to be too activist
on any given case because the next panel—arriving two weeks later—might have
a different composition and take a different tack. This would push Justices to
more minimalistic, narrow, deferential decisions. 138
Cases would also be chosen behind a veil of ignorance. While serving their
two weeks, the Justices would consider petitions for Supreme Court review. But
with such short terms of service, the Justices could not pick cases with an agenda
in mind; another slate of Justices would hear them. 139 Activist lawyers would
not be able to game the system by bringing cases based on their prediction of

135.

See Charlie Savage, Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the Judiciary. Here’s How., N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/trump-judiciary-appeals-courts
-conservatives.html [https://perma.cc/Z625-93G8]; cf. Joseph Fiskin & David E. Pozen,
Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018) (noting that polarization is
largely a Republican phenomenon on issues of constitutional hardball).
136. Cf. McGinnis, supra note 131, at 542 (“Vested for life with the awesome power to make ﬁnal
decisions with wide-ranging consequences for the nation, Supreme Court Justices generally
cannot help but come to see themselves as statesmen rather than as humble arbitrators of legal
disputes.”).
137. See Ilya Shapiro, Justice Kennedy: The Once and Future Swing Vote, CATO (Nov. 13, 2016),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/justice-kennedy-once-future-swing-vote
[https://perma.cc/Q3PT-5J7R].
138.

See McGinnis, supra note 131, at 544 (“Supreme Court riders would have been less able to
instantiate their political vision and would therefore be more likely to follow precedent. Moreover, because the riders would have come from inferior courts, which operate under the threat
of reversal, they would have had more practice in following precedent.”).

139.

See id. at 545; see also Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE
L.J. 399, 424 (2001) (noting brieﬂy McGinnis’s proposal).
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which way the Court would likely decide the issue. The Court’s decisions would
likely be less aggressive in overturning congressional judgments and more
tightly linked to precedent.
There is some chance that randomly selecting appellate judges might lead to
radical swings between different panels, but we think a variety of factors mitigate
this concern. First, assuming a roughly even split between liberal and conservative judges on the courts of appeals, the 6-3 supermajority requirement—combined with the limitation on partisan composition of panels—prevents a lottery
from generating wild swings between ideological majorities. Second, because we
expect a decrease in strategic litigation due to cases being chosen from behind a
veil of ignorance, we think that the Court would hear fewer ideologically motivated cases designed to change the law. Third, we believe the judges themselves
would be a check on radical swings. Most of the panel’s work would take place
from a judge’s home chambers rather than in Washington, so the culture of ordinary appellate decision-making would infuse the judge’s work. A judge who
spends her life on the court of appeals may develop habits of narrower decisionmaking, and may be less likely to envision herself as the grand maker of constitutional law. 140 Equally important, judges who spend their lives on the courts of
appeals will chafe at a Supreme Court whose jurisprudence swings wildly back
and forth. Seeking clarity in order to decide future cases, judges selected for a
Supreme Court panel could very well value narrow decisions and stare decisis
more than our current Justices do.
Most importantly, however, the Supreme Court Lottery approach meets the
desiderata for reform. It would preserve the Court as an institution that isn’t
deﬁned by partisanship, in part by reducing the stakes of individual nominations
to the Court. And it would give a nudge of deference to the political branches.
That combination, we think, offers a strong case for the Lottery approach.

140.
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A number of scholars have noted that there are cultural pathologies to service on the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 131, at 542 (observing that judges who spend their careers primarily on the courts of appeals “would [be] more likely to treat constitutional issues
and other momentous decisions more like the other quotidian matters that they were accustomed to resolving in their courts”); Sherry, supra note 89 (noting that Justices have become
“celebrities” who play to their fan bases). We agree with these observations and think that the
Court’s culture is fundamentally different from that of the courts of appeals, and that primary
service on the latter would shape the Justices’ actions during their occasional service on the
Supreme Court. At the same time, there are tradeoffs in shifting toward the culture of court
of appeals judges. Court of appeals judges might, for example, be more deferential to amici,
parties, and the Solicitor General than are the current Supreme Court Justices. They also
would have less expertise in constitutional cases speciﬁcally.
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2. The Constitutionality of the Supreme Court Lottery
We think the Supreme Court Lottery could be implemented by statute, without a constitutional amendment. It is generally uncontested that Congress has
the power to change the size of the Supreme Court and to set its basic procedures. Congress has utilized those powers, too. It has grown and shrunk the
Court over the centuries, 141 and it has deﬁned many basic provisions of the
Court’s operation. For example, statutes have granted powers to the Chief Justice, required Justices to “ride circuit” for more than a century, and organized the
Court in a variety of other ways. 142
Our reform works from that constitutional baseline. The proposal formally
expands the size of the Court to some 180 judges,143 then provides for how the
Court would hear cases. The President would still nominate every Justice, and
the Senate would still conﬁrm them. The Justices would serve for life, assuming
good behavior, as is current practice. The sitting Supreme Court Justices would
not lose their positions or their lifetime appointments; they would simply enter
the lottery, like all the other Associate Justices. 144 If they wanted, they could also
be appointed to the federal courts of appeals, as the other Associate Justices
would be. And the current Chief Justice would retain his lifetime position and
additional duties, including his constitutionally-prescribed role to preside over
the Senate in an impeachment trial of the President. 145
Still, the proposal raises a variety of constitutional questions, especially for
those working within the highly formalistic methodology favored by the current
conservative majority. While we think we have solid responses, we stress again
141.

See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Checking the Court, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 18, 64 (2016)
(“Nothing in the Constitution speciﬁes the size of the membership of the Supreme Court . . . .
The size and details of the Supreme Court’s membership are up to Congress . . . .”). Indeed,
the proof of the point is that the most notable arguments against altering the size of the Court
state that there is “a strong norm” or “convention” against reforms for “‘packing’ the Supreme
Court” by changing its size, not that any change is manifestly unconstitutional. Grove, supra
note 68, at 505.

142.

See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1) (2018) (vesting the Chief Justice with authority to designate
members of the FISA Court); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74-75 (providing for
circuit riding).
143. There are 179 authorized federal court of appeals judgeships. See Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS.
(Apr. 4, 2019), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies [https://
perma.cc/9VHF-33L5].
144.

Note that this proposal does not run afoul of arguments that the Constitution mandates life
tenure for federal judges. For a discussion of Article III’s Good Behavior Clause, see Prakash
& Smith, supra note 100.
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.

185

the yale law journal

129:148

2019

that our goal is plausibility. Given that these reforms would likely be advanced
against a complex political backdrop of popular sentiment directed against the
Court—and the threat of more radical reform—slam-dunk constitutional arguments may not be necessary.
a. Dual Appointments
Some might argue that it is unconstitutional for a judge to effectively have
two appointments—as a federal court of appeals judge and as an Associate Justice
on the Supreme Court. Article III of the Constitution contemplates the existence
of a Supreme Court and additional inferior courts. The Appointments Clause
also recognizes that the President can appoint Justices of the Supreme Court,
treating that as a distinct position from other, inferior, appointments.
This argument, however, is not persuasive. Unlike other proposals that do
away with the Court, Justices in the Supreme Court Lottery would be appointed
and conﬁrmed to their position on the Supreme Court, in full accordance with
the Appointments Clause. 146 More importantly, the text of the Constitution does
not have any bar on judges serving in two judicial positions, or two commissioned positions of any kind, at the same time. In fact, the Constitution is naturally read to allow it. Article I speciﬁcally bans members of Congress from serving in another role under the Constitution. 147 Thus, as Steven Calabresi and
Joan Larsen have noted, “the Constitution contains an express legislative Incompatibility Clause but no comparable provision exists to bar joint service in the
judicial and executive departments.” 148 The Framers of the Constitution under-

146.

For a discussion, see Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 97, at 859-63. All new judges would of
course be appointed to both positions speciﬁcally, and for those who are particularly concerned on this front, the President could renominate and secure conﬁrmation of all existing
court of appeals judges as Associate Justices. While doing so might seem politically complicated, it would require only a majority vote in the Senate—and, of course, the hypothetical
concern already assumes that the Senate would have voted in favor of the reform statute.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”). There are, in fact, two other
similar clauses. Article I, § 9 prohibits holding “any Office” while also “accept[ing] any
[other] office” from foreign states, and Article II, § 1 prohibits “Senator[s] or Representative[s], or Person[s] holding an Office of Trust or Proﬁt . . . [from being] appointed an Elector.” The omission in Article III is thus particularly notable.
148. Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation
of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1122 (1994). The Founding generation was also aware
of this omission. The Virginia Ratifying Convention urged the First Congress to adopt an
amendment stating: “The Judges of the federal Court shall be incapable of holding any other
Office, or of receiving the Proﬁts of any other Office, or Emolument under the United States
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stood the possibility of conﬂicts arising from holding multiple posts. They accounted for it in one part of the Constitution, but chose not to provide such a
bar for Justices on the Supreme Court.
In addition, historical and contemporary practice suggests that judges can
have multiple roles at once. Foremost, the Judiciary Act of 1789 created federal
circuit courts, but not circuit judgeships. Instead, it required Supreme Court Justices to “ride circuit,” acting as judges on the nascent federal courts. 149 The ﬁrst
Congress thus directed Supreme Court Justices to effectively serve on two courts
at once. This practice was upheld in the 1803 case Stuart v. Laird, 150 even though
the Justices had not been separately appointed to the lower federal courts, and it
persisted throughout the nineteenth century. 151
In addition, some judges have had multiple commissions simultaneously.
Chief Justice John Marshall was, for a time, simultaneously commissioned as
Secretary of State and Chief Justice. 152 Judge Claria Horn Boom currently serves
as a federal district judge for both the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky. 153 Supreme Court Justices have also taken on additional roles, apparently
without concern. Chief Justice John Jay was dispatched to negotiate a peace
treaty with Britain in 1794. 154 Justice Robert Jackson took a leave of absence from

or any of them.” Id. at 1125 (quoting PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON: 1787-1972, at 1057 (Robert
Rutland ed., 1970)). It was not adopted. Id.
149. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74-75 (“[T]he before mentioned districts . . . shall
be divided into three circuits, and . . . there shall be held annually in each district of said circuits, two courts, which shall be called Circuit Courts, and shall consist of any two justices of
the Supreme Court, and the district judge of such districts, any two of whom shall constitute
a quorum . . . .”). See generally Joshua Glick, Comment, On the Road: The Supreme Court and
the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753 (2003) (discussing the history of Supreme Court Justices riding circuit).
150.
151.
152.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
See Glick, supra note 149, at 1754.
The Senate conﬁrmed Marshall’s appointment as Chief Justice on January 27, 1801, yet he did
not resign his position as Secretary of State until March 4 of that year. See 2 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 558-59 (1916); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 178, 184-85, 200-01 (1922).

153.

See Roll Call Vote 115th Congress—2nd Session, U.S. SENATE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://
www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115
&session=2&vote=00065 [https://perma.cc/CAX8-LBFQ].
154. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 17891800, at 243-45 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the controversy over Justice Jay’s
appointment).
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the Court to serve as Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg after World War II. 155
Chief Justice Earl Warren chaired the commission tasked with investigating the
assassination of President Kennedy. 156 Other examples abound. 157
Judges also serve on separately constituted courts from those to which they
were initially conﬁrmed. Some federal district court judges serve a seven-year
term on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, while simultaneously fulﬁlling their district court duties. 158 Judges serve on the U.S. Sentencing Commission, a practice upheld by the Supreme Court.159 And, as discussed in more
detail below, judges and Justices sit by designation on inferior courts, lateral
courts (i.e., a different circuit or district), and superior courts. 160 While each of
these examples differs from holding a dual appointment, they suggest that as a
matter of historical and contemporary practice, judges have had multiple roles
simultaneously. Americans have accepted that variation as legitimate, and often
desirable.
b. The Vesting Clause and “One Supreme Court”
Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power in “one Supreme
Court.” Some contend that this provision mandates that the Supreme Court be
comprised of a single set of persons rather than a rotating group of Justices.161
155.

See Brian R. Gallini, Nuremberg Lives On: How Justice Jackson’s International Experience Continues to Shape Domestic Criminal Procedure, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 20 (2014); see also id. at 34
n.254 (noting that some of Justice Jackson’s colleagues objected to his appointment).
156. See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 148, at 1137.
157.

See Jonathan Lippman, The Judge and Extrajudicial Conduct: Challenges, Lessons Learned, and a
Proposed Framework for Assessing the Propriety of Pursuing Activities Beyond the Bench, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 1341, 1343 (2012) (enumerating examples).
158. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2018).
159.

See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
For example, retired Supreme Court Justices sit on the courts of appeals. Cramton, supra note
97, at 1327. For a brief discussion of “upward designation,” see Stras & Scott, supra note 100,
at 1417-19. For a broad discussion of judges on other courts, see Marin K. Levy, Visiting Judges,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 67 (2019).
161. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 1.1 (10th ed. 2013) (arguing
that “the fact that the Constitution vests the judicial power ‘in only one Supreme Court . . .
does not permit Supreme Court action by committees, panels, or sections’” (quoting William
J. Brennan, Jr., State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court, 31 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 393, 406 (1960)
(alteration in original))). The authors cite a letter from Chief Justice Hughes and articles by
Justices Harlan, Brennan, and Field to support the idea that the Court cannot hear cases as a
panel. Id. They also argue that the rejection of an 1890 proposal for creating panels within the
Supreme Court supports this position. Id. But it is not clear why that inference is reasonable.
First, inferences from legislative inaction should be disfavored. Second, the 1890 moment was
160.
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But this argument suffers from serious inﬁrmities. First, Article III’s Vesting
Clause was partly drafted and designed to address a variety of concerns on the
balance between federalism and nationalism. The government of the Articles of
Confederation did not have a national judiciary; the Vesting Clause established
clearly that the new government would. 162 In addition, during the debates at the
Constitutional Convention, much of the discussion over the creation of the federal courts was about whether there would be any lower federal courts. Some
members of the Convention preferred establishing lower federal courts in the
Constitution, while others feared that lower federal courts would take power
from the states. The compromise was to establish a Supreme Court and permit
(but not require) Congress to create lower federal courts. 163 The drafting history
of the Vesting Clause was tied to these debates more than to some theoretical
sense of oneness.
Moreover, as Klarman has shown, the debate over the Court was tied to the
broader question of “enforcing federal supremacy.” 164 The Convention rejected
the option of a federal veto over state laws in favor of the Supremacy Clause and
the creation of a Supreme Court. 165 In Federalist No. 22, Alexander Hamilton
pointed out that one of the core beneﬁts of a single institution—which would
still apply if personnel ﬂuctuated—is ﬁnality amid a federal system of multiple
courts:
To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories, all nations

one of radical change in any event. The idea of panels within the Court, with full Court review,
had been considered at least as early as 1869, gained the support of a number of prominent
commentators and elected officials, and was one leading option on the table. The other option,
which was ultimately chosen, was the creation of intermediate courts, which brought the
eventual end of the century-long tradition of circuit riding. For a brief discussion of this proposal, see Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, “The Threes”: Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1825 (2008). On circuit riding, see Glick, supra note 149.
162. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“A
circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet to be mentioned—
the want of a judiciary power.”).
163.

MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 164-67 (2016).

164.

Id. at 164.
Id.

165.
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have found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general superintendence and authorized to settle and declare in
the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice. 166
Second, the Vesting Clause argument mistakenly assumes that a singular institution—which the Supreme Court would continue to be under this proposal—
cannot be composed of multiple people in rotation. There is a difference between
having a single institution, which the Vesting Clause clearly requires, and having
that institution with ﬁxed rather than variable membership. Singular institutions—including the current Court—always have a ﬂuctuating membership. At
present, Justices recuse themselves from cases, quorum requirements contemplate that fewer than a full complement of Justices will hear cases, and intertemporally, the Court as an institution changes its personnel with regularity. Institutions can be singular, even if their membership ﬂuctuates. Textually, the
Clause itself does not specify the number of Justices, nor that Court membership
be ﬁxed rather than rotational. When combined with Congress’s power in the
Necessary and Proper Clause to “carry[] into Execution” “all other Powers
vested” in the federal government, 167 the Article III Vesting Clause gives Congress authority to make rules for the creation, composition, and terms of the judiciary—including the Supreme Court. 168 This includes deciding that the
Court’s membership should rotate.
c. Supermajority Voting Requirements
There also are a number of plausible constitutional challenges to a supermajority voting requirement for striking down federal (and possibly state) statutes.
One set of arguments is that Article III implicitly either requires majority rule or

166.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 162, at 150; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws decides the question. Thirteen independent courts of ﬁnal
jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government from
which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.”).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
168.

190

The classic article on the general claim of the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause is
William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President
and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 102 (1976). For more recent takes, see John F. Manning, The Supreme Court,
2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2014); and John
Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045 (2014).

how to save the supreme court

gives the Court the power to decide how to resolve its own cases. 169 Both suffer
from an absence of textual support. 170 A second set of arguments is structural:
that supermajority rules would aggrandize congressional power or effectively determine the outcomes of cases. 171 These arguments, too, are unmoored from any
textual provisions and are effectively a version of “free-form structural” constitutional arguments. 172 It is worth noting, moreover, that whatever normative
strength such arguments have, there are prominent constitutional thinkers who
have questioned the case for simple-majority decisions at the Supreme Court on
normative grounds and noted that values like expertise, respect for constitutional structure, and fairness cut in favor of supermajority requirements. 173
The constitutional case for setting supermajority requirements starts from
the premise that Congress has the power to structure the judiciary. The source
of this power is a combination of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which gives
Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution,” 174 and
the Exceptions Clause, which states that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
“with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.” 175 From the Judiciary Act of 1789 onward, Congress has exercised these
powers. The First Congress not only established the size of the Supreme Court,
but also required that “any four of [the Justices] shall be a quorum.” 176 In terms
of potentially dictating judicial outcomes, a supermajority requirement is not so
different from a quorum requirement. Both are restrictions on how many Justices are needed for a judicial determination to be binding.
Supermajority requirements also have a long history within debates over reforming the Supreme Court. They were proposed at least as early as the 1820s,
169.

For an overview of these challenges, see Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress
and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 77 n.12 (2003).
170. For example, there might be an argument that Article I gives Congress the power to structure
its own rules and operations and that this approach should be applied to Article III as well.
But the opposite argument—that the Constitution contemplates such a provision but excludes
it from Article III—seems at least equally persuasive.
171. See Caminker, supra note 169, at 77 n.12.
172.

Manning, supra note 168, at 32; see also id. at 48-67 (criticizing the use of free-form structural
constitutional arguments).

173.

See, e.g., Shugerman, supra note 134; Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities
Rule on Courts?, 123 YALE L.J. 1692 (2014).

174.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2. For an extensive discussion making this argument, see
Shugerman, supra note 134, at 972-81.
176. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73.
175.
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with another sixty proposals being offered between then and the early 1980s.177
And some states, including Nebraska and North Dakota, have adopted supermajority requirements. 178 The fact that these provisions have been discussed
over almost two centuries certainly does not establish their constitutionality, but
it is worth noting that many have thought such proposals would be constitutional if adopted. 179
d. Historical Practice
Another possible counterargument is that reforms along these lines should
be seen as unconstitutional, or violative of some kind of unwritten convention,
due to the longstanding historical practice of having a single set of Supreme
Court Justices rather than a panel system. 180 Both the Supreme Court and commentators have recognized that historical practice can inform constitutional
meaning. 181 At the same time, however, taking historical practice too far prevents democratic experimentation. Adherents to the historical-practice school
can fall into the trap of arguing that Congress always legislates to its maximal
authorities and that it always explores and implements every possible strategy. 182
In our constitutional system, Congress has been granted signiﬁcant powers under Article I, and there is no provision anywhere in the Constitution that suggests that Congress loses those powers if it chooses not to exercise them for a
period of time. Indeed, the idea that Congress’s Article I powers disappear if
Congress chooses not to use them ﬂies in the face of both Article I’s Vesting
Clause and the separation of powers, which give legislative powers to Congress
whether or not they are exercised at any given moment.

177.
178.

Caminker, supra note 169, at 88.
NEB. CONST. art V, § 2 (requiring ﬁve of the seven justices to hold a law unconstitutional);
N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (requiring four of the ﬁve justices to hold a law unconstitutional);
see also Caminker, supra note 169, at 91-94.

179.

See Caminker, supra note 169, at 88-94 (discussing proposals and justiﬁcations throughout
history).

180.

Cf. Pozen, supra note 111, at 34 (suggesting that court-packing violates “the convention of judicial supremacy over constitutional interpretation”). See generally Bradley & Siegel, supra
note 68 (considering arguments for the impermissibility of court-packing based on historical
practice).

181.

See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (articulating a theory
of how post-Founding practice can answer constitutional questions); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012)
(addressing the proper role of historical practice in the context of the separation of powers
and discussing Supreme Court cases that use historical practice).
182. See Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407 (2017).
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B. The Balanced Bench
1. The Plan and Its Beneﬁts
Our second proposal, the Balanced Bench, looks quite different from the Supreme Court Lottery but addresses similar concerns. The proposal has several
components. First, the Supreme Court would start with ten Justices. Five would
be affiliated with the Democratic Party, and ﬁve with the Republican Party. These
ten Justices would then select ﬁve additional Justices chosen from current circuit
(or possibly district) court judges. The catch? The ten partisan-affiliated Justices
would need to select the additional ﬁve Justices unanimously (or at least by a
strong supermajority requirement). These additional Justices would be chosen
two years in advance, for one-year terms. And if the Justices failed to agree on a
slate of additional colleagues, the Supreme Court would lack a quorum and
could not hear any cases for that year.
The idea behind this proposal is that it provides a mechanism to restore the
notion that Supreme Court Justices are deciding questions of law, in ways that
don’t invariably line up with their political preferences in the biggest cases. That
was once true—even during periods of the most serious political conﬂict over the
Supreme Court, the Justices were not strictly following party lines. As noted
above, 183 during the infamous court-packing drama in the 1930s, the Justices
were closely divided along ideological lines but not party lines.
Today, however, it seems like a quaint notion that Presidents would ever
choose Supreme Court Justices who would vote against their party’s interests in
big cases. The Republicans made this mistake (if it is a mistake) in recent decades, which led them to vow to appoint “no more Souters.” 184 Democrats, despite having had far fewer opportunities to appoint Justices in recent decades,
have done a reasonably good job of identifying ideologically reliable nominees.
Given that both sides seem to realize the stakes of Supreme Court nominations,
it is hard to imagine that there will be many more Justices like Justice Kennedy,
who would sometimes vote “against party” in the biggest cases.
This proposal brings back the possibility of a Supreme Court that is not
wholly partisan. The permanent, partisan-affiliated Justices would have to agree
on colleagues who have a reputation for fairness, independence, and centrism,
and who have views that do not strictly track partisan affiliation: in short, the
kind of judges who have a minimal chance of being appointed to the Supreme
Court today. The permanent Justices would pick such colleagues not for public183.

See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.

184.

See, e.g., No More Souters, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2005, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB112173866457289093 [https://perma.cc/JR43-SWUJ].
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regarding reasons, but out of self-interest. Assuming that those Justices want
their own views to prevail on the Court, they would have an incentive to veto
committed partisans on the other side. But each side might be willing to compromise (really, to gamble) on other judges who seem open-minded and persuadable.
Requiring unanimity among the permanent Justices—or at least a strong supermajority 185—is key to the selection mechanism. Even if one or two of the Justices ended up voting against ideological “type,” requiring all or most of them to
agree would help ensure that committed partisans are not selected for the ﬁnal
ﬁve slots on the Court. We recognize that the Justices might not pick independent-minded Justices for all ﬁve of the visiting slots. Perhaps the two sides would
compromise on a couple of more ideologically reliable Justices. But requiring the
permanent Justices to pick an odd number of Justices means that, at the very
least, they would likely want to pick one moderate (or at least ideologically unpredictable) Justice whose vote could break ties. 186 Our hope, though, is that
they would pick more than one. 187
The permanent Justices would select their visiting colleagues with two years
of lead time. This would reduce the risk of the Justices brokering deals during
185.

A supermajority requirement, rather than a unanimity rule, would reduce the risk of a persistent holdout who refused to select any Justices, thus making the Court unable to sit. Although
one might hope that the permanent Justices would have some incentives not to make the
Court powerless, that cannot be taken for granted. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, EmpireBuilding Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005) (arguing that political
actors do not inevitably seek to maximize the power of their own institutions). In some instances, one or more of the permanent Justices might conclude that maintaining the status
quo by rendering the Court powerless would be preferable to selecting any visiting Justices.
But there are other considerations cutting in the opposite direction. Given asymmetric polarization in the political and constitutional process, it is possible that the Democratic Justices
might systematically be more likely to compromise on choices by their Republican counterparts. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 135, at 940-42 (summarizing political-science ﬁndings
on asymmetric polarization). With that backdrop, the case for unanimity looks stronger: it
would only take one Justice to ensure that all are choosing fairly. Still, we identify the option
of a supermajority requirement for those who are particularly concerned about putting effective veto power in any one Justice.
186. That outcome might seem to recreate the dynamics of recent decades, with well-known
“swing” Justices like Justices Powell, O’Connor, and Kennedy at the center of the Court. Yet
the Balanced Bench would still create an improvement over the status quo. For one, any swing
Justice among the visiting Justices would only be on the Court for a year, thus making it impossible for that Justice to have a sweeping impact on American law and a related cult of personality. Moreover, the larger size of the Court makes it somewhat less likely that any one
Justice would be the swing Justice on most issues.
187.

194

See supra Section III.A (outlining one reform criterion as lessening the importance of individual Justices).
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the selection process to pick colleagues based on their expectations about individual cases or issues. For example, knowing that a gay marriage case was on the
docket, perhaps the Democratic Justices would accept a generally conservative
judge who had a reputation for voting in more liberal directions on important
social issues (like, say, Justice Kennedy). Even assuming the permanent Justices
had such granular information about their potential colleagues, we think delaying the start date of the new Justices would reduce this risk.
Once chosen, the independent Justices would serve for one-year, nonrenewable terms. Although the prospect of renewal might serve as a powerful incentive
for centrism, we think the threat of nonrenewal would undermine the Justices’
independence and damage the internal dynamics of Supreme Court decisionmaking. Moreover, we think there are good reasons to have some Justices with
shorter tenures. As discussed above, the modern Court, with its nine life-tenured
members, is too dominated by cults of personality (think of the “Notorious
RBG”) and too focused on particular Justices’ idiosyncratic views (think of the
emphasis on “Kennedy briefs” in recent years).188 Adding some less well-known,
shorter-term Justices to the Court would signiﬁcantly reduce this problem.
These Justices also could introduce a helpful perspective to the bench, with their
greater diversity of educational, professional, and geographic backgrounds, and
their in-the-trenches experience on the lower courts. 189 To the extent that longterm service on the Supreme Court changes one’s perspective, 190 these Justices
also would not be affected by that bias.
Finally, the visiting Justices—and the explicit partisan-balance requirements—would signiﬁcantly reduce the stakes of Supreme Court nominations.

188.

See id. For an example of the cult of personality surrounding Justice Ginsburg, see IRIN CAR-

MON & SHANA KNIZHNIK, NOTORIOUS RBG: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG

(2015). On Kennedy briefs, see Shapiro, supra note 137 (noting that the Supreme Court Bar
writes briefs “that cite his greatest hits” in order to target Justice Kennedy’s vote). Suzanna
Sherry has recently argued that the problem with the Court is the fact that Justices have become celebrities who “play to their fan base.” Her solution is to prohibit concurrences, dissents, and signed opinions. Opinions would simply stand for the Court, without even reference to the number of Justices who voted for the decision. Sherry, supra note 89, at 1.
189. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A Timely Proposal, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1412-15 (2006) (arguing that Supreme Court Justices should be once
again required to ride circuit in order to get them more exposed to “American grassroots opinion” and the work of the lower courts).
190. There are many reasons why long service on the Court might distort a Justice’s perspective.
One mechanism that a number of commentators have identiﬁed is the so-called “Greenhouse
effect,” by which Supreme Court Justices shift their ideology over time in response to criticism
and praise from the media. For a discussion, see Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the
Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1574-79 (2010).
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Because each political party would hold a set number of seats, and because additional Justices would join the Court no matter what, the fate of issues like abortion would never turn on any one conﬁrmation battle. This proposal might exacerbate the politicization of lower-court nominations because the visiting
Justices would be drawn from the lower courts. But as discussed above, that phenomenon is already happening on its own and is less cause for alarm. 191 Moreover, given the need for independent-minded Justices who could temporarily join
the Supreme Court, the system might actually incentivize Presidents to appoint
some moderates on the lower courts.
In order to replicate some of the veil-of-ignorance beneﬁts provided by the
ﬁrst proposal with respect to the case-selection process, the Court’s internal processes could minimize the visiting Justices’ ability to pick their own cases. For
example, the visiting Justices could join the Court immediately after the “long
conference,” in which the Court votes on a signiﬁcant number of certiorari petitions that have built up over the summer.
A Court designed as we propose would, we hope, issue rulings in big cases
that would not be predictable based solely on party affiliation. Those rulings
would have a greater chance of being seen as legitimate by the public. Thus, this
plan has a chance of saving the image of the Supreme Court as an institution
above politics—and of preserving the image of law as a distinct enterprise.
Given our interest in divorcing the Court from partisan politics, it is a fair
question why we would want to explicitly build in partisan affiliation to the selection of Justices. First of all, someone has to select the visiting Justices. If we
could identify some actor in government who could be reliably trusted to always
select Justices without regard to partisan affiliation, we could simply put that
person on the Supreme Court. Given our inability to identify such a person,
however, the best solution is to design a system that creates incentives for partisan government actors to select for nonpartisan (or, perhaps more accurately, less
partisan) Justices.
But there are other arguments for building in some form of partisan balance.
Indeed, Eric Segall has argued for the institution of a Court permanently and
evenly divided along partisan and ideological lines. 192 He contends that such a
Court would produce narrower, more consensus-based decisions; would “re-

191.

See supra Section IV.A.1 (noting also that the greater number and lower press coverage of circuit-court nominations make individual nominations less crucial).

192.

Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to Improve the United States Supreme Court,
45 PEPP. L. REV. 547 (2018).
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duce the opportunities for ﬁve or more Justices to impose rigid ideological agendas over long periods of time;” and would eliminate the problem of the Court’s
ideology turning on unpredictable deaths or strategically timed retirements. 193
Indeed, our brief experiment with a Court evenly divided along partisan and
ideological lines showed that there was something to Segall’s idea. While the
Court was understaffed for more than a year after Justice Scalia’s death, the Justices generally strove to reach consensus where possible, often deciding cases on
narrower grounds. In fact, the October 2016 Term—in which the Court was
down a Justice for almost the entire Term—displayed the most consensus among
the Justices in more than seventy years. 194 That said, the experiment also revealed downsides of the arrangement. Where the Justices were unable to reach
agreement—in the most ideological cases with the highest stakes—the Court was
left powerless to make law, and the courts of appeals effectively became the Supreme Court. 195 For this reason, a proposal for a permanent, equally divided
Court would need to be accompanied by a set of other wide-ranging reforms,
such as different rules about the consequences of a deadlock. 196
193.

Id. at 550.
194. See Adam Liptak, A Cautious Supreme Court Sets a Modern Record for Consensus, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-term
-consensus.html [https://perma.cc/26ME-HWVK].
195.

This happened in Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam), regarding the constitutionality of President
Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA)
program—which granted temporary work authorizations to certain undocumented immigrants who were the parents of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents. There, the Justices’
even split allowed the Fifth Circuit’s enjoinment of the program to stand. A similar result with
the opposite ideological valence occurred in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, No. 1357095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct.
1083 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam), which involved a constitutional challenge to rules requiring
nonunion members to pay for collective-bargaining expenses by unions designated as the exclusive bargaining representative. The Ninth Circuit, relying on Supreme Court precedent,
had rejected the challenge. The Supreme Court split 4-4, leaving the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in
place. Two years later, when Justice Gorsuch had joined the Court, the Justices overturned
precedent and declared such arrangements unconstitutional. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty.,
& Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
196. Whereas current law gives lower courts the power to set the status quo—an equally divided
Court results in automatic affirmance of the judgment below—one could imagine setting different default rules. For example, the law might provide that an equally divided Court has the
effect of overturning any judgment that strikes down an act of Congress, as a way to build in
slightly more deference. Another variant might provide that if the Supreme Court cannot
reach a supermajority, the act of Congress stands, regardless of the lower court decision. Depending on the design of these rules, a proposal for a permanent eight-member Court might
need to be accompanied by limits on the ability of lower courts to issue so-called “nationwide”
or “universal” injunctions, as they let individual circuits effectively set the law for the entire
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But even if implemented appropriately, an evenly divided Court would not
solve one of the most signiﬁcant problems we hope to address: the widespread
perception that the Supreme Court is simply one more political institution,
where votes in the biggest cases turn on party affiliation. Indeed, adopting explicit partisan-balance requirements without making additional changes would
only exacerbate this perception. For this reason, having the permanent Justices
select additional Justices to join the Court is critical to the proposal’s success.
While having Justices choose their colleagues might initially seem strange,
this proposal resembles the way civil arbitration often works. Under many bilateral arbitration agreements, the two sides each select one arbitrator. The two
party-chosen arbitrators then agree collectively on a third, neutral arbitrator. Indeed, such provisions date back to at least the late eighteenth century. 197 Their
continued and widespread use likely reﬂects the view that this method is effective
at procuring unbiased and fair decision-makers—or, perhaps better stated, decision-makers who will appear unbiased and fair to both sides.
Commercial arbitration has many disanalogies with democratic politics, to
be sure. Even so, there are important reasons to care about designing procedures
that the eventual losers can live with. A concern for appearance is an important
reason why we think it is necessary to incorporate partisan-affiliated Justices into
the decision-making process. Their presence ensures that both sides’ best arguments will be aired and considered. Thus, they will help ensure that the losing
side feels that the decision-making process was fair, even if it did not yield its
desired outcome. 198 The result would be a Court that did not always vote along
strictly partisan lines, but also one in which both sides’ interests were well represented in decision-making. We think such a Court would have an excellent
chance of preserving public legitimacy.
One other objection concerns our proposal’s emphasis on partisan balance.
Why should the Court’s design evenly balance the two parties (and thus their

country. For a recent discussion of nationwide injunctions, see Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017).
197.

See Brian Winn & Earl Davis, Arbitration of Reinsurance Disputes: Is There a Better Way?, DISP.
RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2004, at 22 (noting a 1793 insurance contract which provided that “if any
Dispute should arise relating to the Loss on this Policy; it shall be referred to two indifferent
Persons, one to be chosen by the Assured, the other by the Assurer, who shall have full Power
to adjust the same; but in case they cannot agree, then such two persons shall choose a third;
and any two of them agreeing, shall be obligatory to both parties”).

198.

Cf. Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?, 35
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 443 (2014) (“For the parties [to an arbitration], having a say in deciding
their case [by choosing one of the arbitrators] is both appealing and reassuring, and strengthens their support to the entire process.”).
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respective judicial ideologies) no matter what, instead of allowing for more variability based on the results of the political process? We have a couple responses.
First, as a comparative matter, we think our proposal would be an improvement
over the status quo. Over the last half-century, Democrats have controlled the
Presidency for twenty out of ﬁfty years, but have appointed only four Justices;
Republicans have appointed fourteen (ﬁfteen if you count moving William
Rehnquist from Associate Justice to Chief Justice). 199 That skew has been the
result of deaths, strategically timed retirements, and other factors. The Balanced
Bench would make each party’s power over the Court more regular and predictable, and make the Court’s membership much less contested in electoral politics.
Our proposal would not, however, take into consideration a long string of
political victories. Democrats controlled the Presidency from 1933 to 1949; during this time, Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman appointed thirteen Justices to the Court. Under the Balanced Bench, the Court’s partisan composition would have looked exactly the same at the beginning of their tenure as
it did at the end. Would it be fair to have an evenly divided Supreme Court after
so many years of control by one party?
We offer a few points in response. First, regardless of which party wins presidential elections, it is still possible that the country as a whole might be closeto-evenly divided along partisan lines. If so, a partisan-balance requirement
would be more democratic than it might appear. Indeed, given all the forces that
shape the results of presidential elections, it is far from clear why the party identiﬁcation of the President alone is the best proxy for the democratic preferences
of the country when it comes to the Supreme Court. Second, to the extent there
is concern about unfairness, lower-court judges would be selected by presidents
under the ordinary procedures; in a Roosevelt-Truman scenario, the pool from
which the visiting Justices are selected would skew considerably toward the
Democratic side.
Moreover, our proposal is focused on public perception, and an evenly divided Court has the best chance of solving a crisis that has bitterly divided the
country. While such a proposal might seem inconsistent with basic democratic
principles, there is a long tradition of deviating from simple majoritarianism in
designing how power will be distributed in governmental institutions. In our
own constitutional system, the Senate and Electoral College were necessary compromises to satisfy smaller states during the drafting of the Constitution. 200
Many other countries have adopted forms of “consociationalism,” in which the
199.

Supreme Court Nominations, Present-1789, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout
/reference/nominations/Nominations.shtml [https://perma.cc/FDW9-RPBX].
200. See KLARMAN, supra note 163, at 182-205, 230-32.
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constitution is explicitly designed to share power among religious, regional, or
ethnic interests in order to protect minority groups and to create stability. 201 Dividing power on the Supreme Court along party lines would be a way to implement this strategy in order to keep “red America” and “blue America” from tearing each other apart.
Finally, to the extent that critics might have concern over this proposal’s
seeming tendency to permit the minority to govern the majority (with the help
of the visiting Justices), one solution would be to pair this reform with the supermajority voting role considered above.
2. The Constitutionality of the Balanced Bench
As with the Supreme Court Lottery, this proposal would be subject to some
signiﬁcant constitutional objections. Again, we think there are plausible responses. Some of the objections overlap with constitutional arguments against
the Supreme Court Lottery—in particular, the argument that it would be impermissible for judges to serve both as circuit court judges and as Supreme Court
Justices 202—so we do not repeat them here.
a. Appointments Clause Challenges
The Appointments Clause provides that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments. 203
Under our proposal, some of the Justices would be selected by other Justices, an
arrangement that is permissible for “inferior Officers” but not for so-called
“principal” officers—and explicitly not for “Judges of the supreme Court.” Under a straightforward reading of the Clause, this proposal thus seems unconstitutional.

201.

See AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977).

202.

See supra Section IV.A.2.a.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

203.
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As it happens, however, existing law and practice permit signiﬁcant ﬂexibility in the movement of Article III judges within the federal judiciary. District
judges regularly sit by designation on circuit courts; circuit judges regularly sit
by designation on district courts or other circuits; 204 and retired Supreme Court
Justices regularly sit by designation on courts of appeals. 205 Justice Souter, for
example, often sits with the First Circuit, on which he brieﬂy served as a judge
before joining the Supreme Court. 206 When judges sit by designation on different Article III courts, they are not newly nominated by the President and conﬁrmed by the Senate. Instead, they are designated by the chief judge of the circuit
in which they are visiting, or in some instances the Chief Justice. 207 Their initial
President-and-Senate appointment seems to be sufficient. 208
Our proposal functions similarly, letting Supreme Court Justices invite lower
court judges to sit with them for limited periods. If there is a problem with our
proposal, then there are serious problems with these widespread practices in the
lower courts. Some have, to be sure, criticized the status quo. Stras and Scott,
204.

See Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2415 (2014) (noting the regularity of the participation of visiting judges in the courts of appeals). For an in-depth analysis
of the use of visiting judges, see Levy, supra note 160.

205.

See E. Jon A. Gryskiewicz, The Semi-Retirement of Senior Supreme Court Justices: Examining
Their Service on the Courts of Appeals, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 285, 287 (2015) (“Eleven of the
thirty-eight [Justices who became eligible to retire from the Supreme Court and sit by designation on lower courts] have done so.”).

206.

Michelle Olson, Justice Souter: Working in Reverse, by Choice, APP. DAILY (Feb. 27, 2013, 8:22
AM), http://www.appellatedaily.blogspot.com/2013/02/justice-souter-working-in-reverse
-by.html [https://perma.cc/NP8C-5GJ2].
207. See 28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (2018) (“The Chief Justice of the United States may, in the public interest, designate and assign temporarily any circuit judge to act as circuit judge in another
circuit upon request by the chief judge or circuit justice of such circuit.”); id. § 291(b) (“The
chief judge of a circuit or the circuit justice may, in the public interest, designate and assign
temporarily any circuit judge within the circuit, including a judge designated and assigned to
temporary duty therein, to hold a district court in any district within the circuit.”); id. § 292(a)
(“The chief judge of a circuit may designate and assign one or more district judges within the
circuit to sit upon the court of appeals or a division thereof whenever the business of that court
so requires.”). Designations also require the consent of the chief judge of the visiting judge’s
home circuit. See id. § 295 (“No designation and assignment of a circuit or district judge in
active service shall be made without the consent of the chief judge or judicial council of the
circuit from which the judge is to be designated and assigned.”).
208. Although the constitutional text does not make it explicit, it has long been thought that lowercourt judges are also principal officers requiring presidential nomination and Senate conﬁrmation. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 191 n.7 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (observing that “from the early days of the Republic ‘[t]he practical construction has uniformly
been that [judges of the inferior courts] are not . . . inferior officers,’ and I doubt many today
would disagree” (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 456 n.1 (1833) (alterations in original)).

201

the yale law journal

129:148

2019

for example, argue that senior judges—who regularly sit by designation on other
courts—violate the Appointments Clause, and must instead be separately appointed and conﬁrmed to the distinct office of “senior judge.” 209 Thus far, such
arguments seem to have fallen on deaf ears in both the judiciary and Congress.
There is even precedent for a court being entirely comprised of judges chosen
by a Supreme Court Justice. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, the Chief Justice of the United States designates:
11 district court judges from at least seven of the United States judicial
circuits of whom no fewer than 3 shall reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia who shall constitute a court which shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States . . . . 210
The judges of this court—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC)—are Article III judges, but they are not formally nominated by the President or conﬁrmed by the Senate to serve in their dual roles as FISC judges. Appointment by the Chief Justice is apparently sufficient. The Chief Justice has
similar power to choose three judges to constitute an appellate court that reviews
the decisions of the FISC. 211
We think it would be similarly permissible for the Justices to choose additional Article III judges to visit the Supreme Court. We also note that the Appointments Clause challenge could further be reduced by adopting the strategy
endorsed in our ﬁrst proposal—formally appoint all circuit judges as Supreme
Court Justices. That approach would eliminate the objection that the additional
Justices needed to be nominated and conﬁrmed as Justices of the Supreme Court.
b. Partisan-Balance Requirements
Another objection could be raised to our proposal’s explicit inclusion of partisan-balance requirements. Would requiring that the President appoint Justices
of particular parties unconstitutionally limit her appointment power or otherwise violate the Constitution? If so, a wide range of well-established practices
209.

David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453,
516-18 (2007).
210. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1) (2018).
211.
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Id. § 1803(b) (“The Chief Justice shall publicly designate three judges, one of whom shall be
publicly designated as the presiding judge, from the United States district courts or courts of
appeals who together shall comprise a court of review which shall have jurisdiction to review
the denial of any application made under this chapter.”).
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would be called into question. Similar requirements ﬁrst appeared in the nineteenth century. 212 There are now dozens of agencies with some form of partisanbalance requirement. 213 Presidents have largely acquiesced to such requirements
for many decades, and the courts have never held that they are unconstitutional. 214
Typical partisan-balance requirements do not explicitly state that particular
seats belong to Democrats or Republicans, but instead state that no more than a
set number of members can come from the same political party—effectively forcing the President to choose members of the other party (or independents) for
the remaining positions. Brian Feinstein and Daniel Hemel argue that such requirements have more “bite” today than they once did, as increasing partisan
polarization has meant that cross-party appointees are more likely to have ideologies that strongly diverge from their appointing President’s. 215 While in earlier
periods it was easier for Presidents to ﬁnd more moderate opposite party members to appoint, that is less true today.
When it comes to appointing Supreme Court Justices, it is not clear that a
mere limit on the number of same-party appointees on the Court would be sufﬁcient. Given the stakes, one might expect some number of qualiﬁed but highly
ideological judicial nominees to simply change their party allegiance to independent (or say, Libertarian) in order to improve their chances of being selected.
A related piece of gamesmanship occurred in the early 2000s on the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, “when two Republican members of the Commission
changed their registration to independent. Their switches allowed President
George W. Bush to name two additional Republicans to the commission, bringing the number of Republican or recently Republican members of the panel to
six [out of eight members].” 216
For this reason, it might be necessary to impose further constraints on presidential decision-making. One could imagine drafting the statute to explicitly
specify that particular seats must be ﬁlled by members of particular parties. That
might not be enough to prevent gamesmanship, however, as some potential
nominees might just officially join the opposing party in order to maintain eligibility. Federal judges or candidates for judgeships often also refuse party membership in order to retain the perception of neutrality; requiring membership
212.

Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 17 (2018).
213. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski et al., Partisan Balance Requirements in the Age of New Formalism,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 941, 1009-15 tbl.1 (2015).
214. See Feinstein & Hemel, supra note 212, at 21-22.
215.
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See id. at 14.
Id. at 21.
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would undermine that norm. Moreover, this approach might even raise constitutional concerns. Recently, the Third Circuit struck down a Delaware constitutional provision which required partisan balance in the state court system. 217
The court found that the provision violated the First Amendment because it precluded state residents who were not members of the two major political parties
from becoming candidates for judicial office, thereby limiting their associational
freedom. 218 While the Third Circuit’s decision is not self-evidently correct, it
suggests that a system that explicitly mandated membership in particular parties
would be problematic.
There are, however, other solutions that might accomplish the same goal
without requiring that the nominees themselves be party members. One option
would be to require the President to choose nominees for some of the seats from
a list prepared by Senate leadership of the opposite party or by some kind of
bipartisan commission. Such a restriction on presidential power would no doubt
be subject to challenge, but there are some analogies in existing practice. Under
District of Columbia law, the President must select judicial nominees to the D.C.
court system from a list prepared by the multimember District of Columbia Judicial Nomination Commission. 219 Despite signiﬁcant grounds for possible constitutional objection, 220 Presidents of both parties have generally abided by this
system’s requirements rather than picking a legal ﬁght. 221

217.

Adams v. Governor of Del., 914 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 2019). The relevant constitutional provision
governing the Delaware Supreme Court dictated that “three of the ﬁve Justices of the Supreme
Court in office at the same time, shall be of one major political party, and two of said Justices
shall be of the other major political party.” DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3. For an argument anticipating the Third Circuit’s decision, see Joel Edan Friedlander, Is Delaware’s “Other Major Political Party” Really Entitled to Half of Delaware’s Judiciary?, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 1139, 1139 (2016).
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D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-204.33 (West 2001).
The most obvious objection concerns the Appointments Clause. By limiting the President’s
power to nominate whomever she wishes to a federal office, such a law might impermissibly
encroach on the separation of powers. See, e.g., Note, Congressional Restrictions on the President’s
Appointment Power and the Role of Longstanding Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1914, 1919 (2007) (suggesting that “there is strong evidence that the original
understanding of the Appointments Clause grants the President plenary appointment power
contingent only on Senate conﬁrmation”).
President Trump recently selected a nominee for the D.C. Court of Appeals, Joshua Deahl,
from a list prepared by the Commission. See JNC Recommends Candidates for DC Court of Appeals Vacancy, JUD. NOMINATION COMMISSION (May 10, 2017), https://jnc.dc.gov/release/jnc
-recommends-candidates-dc-court-appeals-vacancy [https://perma.cc/GY2X-L5EP]; Seven
Nominations Sent to the Senate, WHITE HOUSE (May 2, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov
/presidential-actions/seven-nominations-sent-senate-2 [https://perma.cc/NP4H-ZZ7A].
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The stakes are higher here, and thus there is surely a greater chance that these
kinds of restrictions would be challenged. The example proves, however, that it
is at least possible to reach a settlement that both sides can live with even in the
face of some constitutional objections. Moreover, despite the occasional gamesmanship discussed above, the partisan-balance requirements used by federal
agencies seem to be largely honored by Presidents of both parties—even though
the rules could be manipulated more frequently. Both sides can abide by a system
that beneﬁts them equally over time, rather than ﬁghting tooth and nail in the
short term. It is our hope that such a settlement is possible here, if both sides
could be convinced that this system is better than the open partisan warfare into
which our current system is degenerating.
Indeed, the most constitutionally practical solution would be one that did
not depend on formally enshrining partisan balance, but which depended solely
on informal agreements and unwritten norms among party leaders. Imagine, for
example, a system in which the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders informally
had to agree on which nominees would be acceptable for the ten permanent seats.
One example is presented by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), whose
statute mandates that no more than three of its six commissioners may come
from the same political party. 222 In practice, “the majority and minority party
leaders in both chambers of Congress take turns sending to the President the
names of candidates that they want appointed to the FEC.” 223 This example suggests the possibility of some informal agreement about the partisan breakdown
of Justices. Of course, the FEC itself may not present a good model to emulate,
as it is an institution that has been subject to ﬁerce partisan contestation and
dysfunction in recent years. 224 As this example shows, informal norms can break
down in the face of partisan conﬂict. Recent experience suggests that is certainly
true when it comes to the Supreme Court nominations process.
conclusion
The Supreme Court may soon face a profound legitimacy crisis. In this Feature, we have offered two different proposals that could save the Supreme Court
from that fate. Neither is perfect; each would fail to address some of the problems with the way the Supreme Court currently operates. We are conﬁdent,
222.

52 U.S.C. § 30106 (2018) (“No more than 3 members of the Commission appointed under
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223. Jamin B. Raskin, “A Complicated and Indirect Encroachment”: Is the Federal Election Commission
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224. See, e.g., Daniel I. Weiner, Fixing the FEC: An Agenda for Reform, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 36 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/2019_04_FECV
_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA22-X9AM] (discussing partisan gridlock at the FEC).
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however, that either proposal would be an improvement over the status quo—
especially given how we expect our already-broken system to deteriorate even
further in the near term. These proposals have the potential to help clean up the
toxic conﬁrmation process and reduce the temperature of Supreme Court politics. And they have a chance of preventing a profound legitimacy crisis that could
undermine public conﬁdence in the enterprise of law.
Either proposal could be taken as a blueprint for reform on its own, or components of each could be combined in some way as a model for change. But
whether our particular proposals are adopted, in whole or in part, is less important than recognizing the need for some kind of reform to the Court’s structure—and the goals that reform must meet to be successful and stable. Reform
that doesn’t address the core legitimacy challenges the Court faces will, like the
status quo, become increasingly untenable. Radically changing the Supreme
Court is necessary if we hope to preserve what is good about the Court.
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